Does Corruption Affect the Private Provision of Public Goods?

Other publication type


Publication Details

Author(s): Cagala T, Glogowsky U, Grimm V, Rincke J, Tuset Cueva A
Publication year: 2016


Abstract


We present controlled experimental evidence on how corruption affects the private provision of public goods. Subjects in our experiment donate to nonprofit associations. The associations provide local public goods that benefit all subjects. We compare average contributions between two conditions with the same efficiency: a corruption condition, where an administrator can expropriate part of contributions, and a control condition without corruption. Compared to the control condition, subjects matched to an expropriating administrator significantly reduce their contributions. Hence, contributors are less inclined to behave prosocially (i.e. are more likely to free-ride) if they are exposed to corruption. We demonstrate that this effect works through a specific channel: corruption breaks the otherwise positive link between baseline preferences for cooperation and private contributions to public goods.



FAU Authors / FAU Editors

Cagala, Tobias
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik
Glogowsky, Ulrich
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik
Grimm, Veronika Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie
Rincke, Johannes Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik
Tuset Cueva, Amanda
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik


How to cite

APA:
Cagala, T., Glogowsky, U., Grimm, V., Rincke, J., & Tuset Cueva, A. (2016). Does Corruption Affect the Private Provision of Public Goods?

MLA:
Cagala, Tobias, et al. Does Corruption Affect the Private Provision of Public Goods? 2016.

BibTeX: 

Last updated on 2018-10-08 at 08:54