Analysing and attacking the I2P Network Database
Egger C (2013)
Publication Language: English
Publication Type: Thesis
Publication year: 2013
URI: https://static.siccegge.de/pdfs/bachelor-thesis.pdf
Abstract
Anonymity networks, such as Tor or I2P, were built to allow users to access network resources
(e.g., to publicly express their opinion) without revealing their identity. Newer designs, like I2P,
run in a completely decentralized way, while older systems, like Tor, are built around central
authorities. The decentralized approach has advantages (no trusted central party, better scala-
bility), but there are also security risks associated with the use of distributed hash tables (DHTs)
in this environment.
I2P was built with these security problems in mind, and the network is considered to provide
anonymity for all practical purposes. Unfortunately, this is not entirely justified. In this thesis,
we present a group of attacks that can be used to deanonymize I2P users. Specifically, we show
that an attacker, with relatively limited resources, is able to deanonymize any I2P user with high
probability.
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How to cite
APA:
Egger, C. (2013). Analysing and attacking the I2P Network Database (Bachelor thesis).
MLA:
Egger, Christoph. Analysing and attacking the I2P Network Database. Bachelor thesis, 2013.
BibTeX: Download
