The Role of Verifiability and Privacy in the Strategic Provision of Performance Feedback: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Özdemir D, Ertac S, Kockesen L (2016)
Publication Language: English
Publication Type: Journal article
Publication year: 2016
Journal
Pages Range: 24-45
Journal Issue: 100
URI: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825616300884?via=ihub
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.009
Open Access Link: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.009
Abstract
We theoretically and experimentally analyze the role of verifiability and privacy in a strategic performance feedback using a "one-principal-two-agent" context with real effort. Mechanisms and private-verified feedback is the most informative mechanism. Yet, subjects thus exhibit some behavior that can not be explained by our baseline model, such as telling the truth even if this will definitely hurt them, interpreting "no feedback" more optimistically than they should, and being affected by feedback given to the other agent , We show that a model with individual-specific lying costs and naive agents can account for some, but not all, of these findings. We conclude that
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APA:
Özdemir, D., Ertac, S., & Kockesen, L. (2016). The Role of Verifiability and Privacy in the Strategic Provision of Performance Feedback: Theory and Experimental Evidence. Games and Economic Behavior, 100, 24-45. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.009
MLA:
Özdemir, Duygu, Seda Ertac, and Levent Kockesen. "The Role of Verifiability and Privacy in the Strategic Provision of Performance Feedback: Theory and Experimental Evidence." Games and Economic Behavior 100 (2016): 24-45.
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