The Role of Verifiability and Privacy in the Strategic Provision of Performance Feedback: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Journal article


Publication Details

Author(s): Özdemir D, Ertac S, Kockesen L
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Publication year: 2016
Journal issue: 100
Pages range: 24-45
ISSN: 0899-8256
Language: English


Abstract


We theoretically and experimentally analyze the role of verifiability and privacy in a strategic performance feedback using a "one-principal-two-agent" context with real effort. Mechanisms and private-verified feedback is the most informative mechanism. Yet, subjects thus exhibit some behavior that can not be explained by our baseline model, such as telling the truth even if this will definitely hurt them, interpreting "no feedback" more optimistically than they should, and being affected by feedback given to the other agent , We show that a model with individual-specific lying costs and naive agents can account for some, but not all, of these findings. We conclude that


FAU Authors / FAU Editors

Taxil-Webber, Duygu
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie


External institutions with authors

Koç-Universität (KU)


How to cite

APA:
Özdemir, D., Ertac, S., & Kockesen, L. (2016). The Role of Verifiability and Privacy in the Strategic Provision of Performance Feedback: Theory and Experimental Evidence. Games and Economic Behavior, 100, 24-45. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.009

MLA:
Özdemir, Duygu, Seda Ertac, and Levent Kockesen. "The Role of Verifiability and Privacy in the Strategic Provision of Performance Feedback: Theory and Experimental Evidence." Games and Economic Behavior 100 (2016): 24-45.

BibTeX: 

Last updated on 2019-08-04 at 11:53