Tragedy of the Fiscal Common?: Fiscal Stock Externalities in a Leviathan Model of Federalism.

Beitrag in einer Fachzeitschrift


Details zur Publikation

Autorinnen und Autoren: Wrede M
Zeitschrift: Public Choice
Verlag: Springer Verlag (Germany)
Jahr der Veröffentlichung: 1999
Band: 101
Seitenbereich: 177-193
ISSN: 0048-5829
Sprache: Englisch


Abstract


The paper deals with vertical tax competition between self-interested governments in a dynamic environment. In a federation, competition between the federal and the state governments arises when tax sources are not separated but pooled. Since dynamic inefficiencies will be stressed, the focus is on fiscal stock externalities rather than on flow externalities. The paper shows that the Leviathans in a federation tax the fiscal common resource more extensively than the single Leviathan in a unitary state. Furthermore, the positive impact of political stability on public consumption of the fiscal common will be discussed.



FAU-Autorinnen und Autoren / FAU-Herausgeberinnen und Herausgeber

Wrede, Matthias Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Sozialpolitik


Zitierweisen

APA:
Wrede, M. (1999). Tragedy of the Fiscal Common?: Fiscal Stock Externalities in a Leviathan Model of Federalism. Public Choice, 101, 177-193.

MLA:
Wrede, Matthias. "Tragedy of the Fiscal Common?: Fiscal Stock Externalities in a Leviathan Model of Federalism." Public Choice 101 (1999): 177-193.

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Zuletzt aktualisiert 2018-10-08 um 01:54

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