Yardstick Competition to Tame the Leviathan

Beitrag in einer Fachzeitschrift

Details zur Publikation

Autor(en): Wrede M
Zeitschrift: European Journal of Political Economy
Verlag: Elsevier
Jahr der Veröffentlichung: 2001
Band: 17
Seitenbereich: 705-721
ISSN: 0176-2680
Sprache: Englisch


This papers analyzes the disciplining role of elections under asymmetric information, when voters can rely on relative performance evaluation to tame a Leviathan. When elections are held in different regions, voters are able to reduce political rents below the Leviathan level by retrospective voting strategies. The paper compares a multi-candidate model with a two-party system with either independent or coordinated policies in the various jurisdictions. In general, voters prefer the multi-candidate system. However, the disciplining ability of voters under the two-party system is strengthened if each party has a uniform leadership that determines policies in all regions.

FAU-Autoren / FAU-Herausgeber

Wrede, Matthias Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Sozialpolitik


Wrede, M. (2001). Yardstick Competition to Tame the Leviathan. European Journal of Political Economy, 17, 705-721. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0176-2680(01)00052-0

Wrede, Matthias. "Yardstick Competition to Tame the Leviathan." European Journal of Political Economy 17 (2001): 705-721.


Zuletzt aktualisiert 2018-10-08 um 22:58