Vertical Externalities and Control of Politicians

Beitrag in einer Fachzeitschrift


Details zur Publikation

Autorinnen und Autoren: Wrede M
Zeitschrift: Economics of Governance
Verlag: Springer Verlag
Jahr der Veröffentlichung: 2002
Band: 3
Seitenbereich: 135-151
ISSN: 1435-6104
eISSN: 1435-8131
Sprache: Englisch


Abstract


A major role of (repeated) elections is to create incentives for politicians to act in the interests of voters. This paper considers the disciplining role of elections in countries with either one or two levels of government. Simple retrospective voting strategies which are based on cut-off levels with respect to expenditure and tax rates are considered. It is shown that the power of voters

is weakened if a second independent level of government is added. However, voters can partially reinforce their power by making politicians not only liable for their own policy, but also for the policy carried out at each other level of government.



FAU-Autorinnen und Autoren / FAU-Herausgeberinnen und Herausgeber

Wrede, Matthias Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Sozialpolitik


Zitierweisen

APA:
Wrede, M. (2002). Vertical Externalities and Control of Politicians. Economics of Governance, 3, 135-151. https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s101010100035

MLA:
Wrede, Matthias. "Vertical Externalities and Control of Politicians." Economics of Governance 3 (2002): 135-151.

BibTeX: 

Zuletzt aktualisiert 2018-11-08 um 02:27