Uniformity Requirement and Political Accountability

Beitrag in einer Fachzeitschrift

Details zur Publikation

Autor(en): Wrede M
Zeitschrift: Journal of Economics
Verlag: Springer Verlag (Germany)
Jahr der Veröffentlichung: 2006
Heftnummer: 89
Seitenbereich: 95-113
ISSN: 0931-8658
Sprache: Englisch


This paper discusses the fundamental hypothesis of policy uniformity under

centralized decision making, which underlies Oates’ famous decentralization

theorem. The theorem has, in more recent times, come under pressure owing to

the prediction that local public goods are provided to minimum winning coalitions

rather than uniformly. The focus of this paper is on the impact of uniformity

rules on political accountability. Using the concept of minimum winning coalitions,

it is shown that the power of voters over politicians vanishes if election

districts receive different levels of local public goods. However, the setting up of

sufficiently strong uniformity rules means that voters regain power. According to

Oates’ theorem, uniformity is the main disadvantage of centralization but,

according to the analysis undertaken in this paper, centralization without uniformity

would be even worse.

FAU-Autoren / FAU-Herausgeber

Wrede, Matthias Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Sozialpolitik


Wrede, M. (2006). Uniformity Requirement and Political Accountability. Journal of Economics, 89, 95-113. https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-006-0209-3

Wrede, Matthias. "Uniformity Requirement and Political Accountability." Journal of Economics 89 (2006): 95-113.


Zuletzt aktualisiert 2018-11-08 um 02:15