Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivations for Tax Compliance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Germany

Beitrag in einer Fachzeitschrift


Details zur Publikation

Autor(en): Dwenger N, Kleven H, Rasul I, Rincke J
Zeitschrift: American Economic Journal-Economic Policy
Verlag: American Economic Association
Jahr der Veröffentlichung: 2016
Band: 8
Heftnummer: 3
Seitenbereich: 203-232
ISSN: 1945-7731
Sprache: Englisch


Abstract


We study extrinsic and intrinsic motivations for tax compliance in the context of a local church tax in Germany. This tax system has historically relied on zero deterrence so that any compliance at baseline is intrinsically motivated. Starting from this zero deterrence baseline, we implement a field experiment that incentivized compliance through deterrence or rewards. Using administrative records of taxes paid and true tax liabilities, we use these treatments to document that intrinsically motivated compliance is substantial, that a significant fraction of it may be driven by duty-to-comply preferences, and that there is no crowd-out between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations.



FAU-Autoren / FAU-Herausgeber

Rincke, Johannes Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik


Autor(en) der externen Einrichtung(en)
The London School of Economics and Political Science
Universität Hohenheim
University College London (UCL) (University of London)


Zitierweisen

APA:
Dwenger, N., Kleven, H., Rasul, I., & Rincke, J. (2016). Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivations for Tax Compliance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Germany. American Economic Journal-Economic Policy, 8(3), 203-232. https://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150083

MLA:
Dwenger, Nadja, et al. "Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivations for Tax Compliance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Germany." American Economic Journal-Economic Policy 8.3 (2016): 203-232.

BibTeX: 

Zuletzt aktualisiert 2018-10-08 um 23:58