An Incentive Theory of Matching

Beitrag in einer Fachzeitschrift


Details zur Publikation

Autor(en): Merkl C, Snower D, Brown AJG
Zeitschrift: Macroeconomic Dynamics
Verlag: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Jahr der Veröffentlichung: 2015
Band: 19
Heftnummer: 3
Seitenbereich: 1-26
ISSN: 1365-1005
Sprache: Englisch


Abstract


This paper presents a theory of the labor market matching process in terms of incentive-based, two-sided search among heterogeneous agents. The matching process is decomposed into its two component stages: the contact stage, in which job searchers make contact with employers, and the selection stage, in which they decide whether to match. We construct a theoretical model explaining two-sided selection through microeconomic incentives. Firms face adjustment costs in responding to heterogeneous variations in the characteristics of workers and jobs. Matches and separations are described through firms' job offer and firing decisions and workers' job acceptance and quit decisions. Our calibrated model for the United States can account for important empirical regularities, such as the large volatilities of labor market variables, that the conventional matching model cannot.



FAU-Autoren / FAU-Herausgeber

Merkl, Christian Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Makroökonomik


Zitierweisen

APA:
Merkl, C., Snower, D., & Brown, A.J.G. (2015). An Incentive Theory of Matching. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 19(3), 1-26. https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1365100513000527

MLA:
Merkl, Christian, Dennis Snower, and Alessio J. G. Brown. "An Incentive Theory of Matching." Macroeconomic Dynamics 19.3 (2015): 1-26.

BibTeX: 

Zuletzt aktualisiert 2018-10-08 um 23:42