Practical attacks against the I2P network

Beitrag bei einer Tagung


Details zur Publikation

Autorinnen und Autoren: Egger C, Schlumberger J, Kruegel C, Vigna G
Jahr der Veröffentlichung: 2013
Seitenbereich: 432-451
ISBN: 9783642412837
Sprache: Englisch


Abstract


Anonymity networks, such as Tor or I2P, were built to allow users to access network resources without revealing their identity. Newer designs, like I2P, run in a completely decentralized fashion, while older systems, like Tor, are built around central authorities. The decentralized approach has advantages (no trusted central party, better scalability), but there are also security risks associated with the use of distributed hash tables (DHTs) in this environment. I2P was built with these security problems in mind, and the network is considered to provide anonymity for all practical purposes. Unfortunately, this is not entirely justified. In this paper, we present a group of attacks that can be used to deanonymize I2P users. Specifically, we show that an attacker, with relatively limited resources, is able to deanonymize a I2P user that accesses a resource of interest with high probability. © 2013 Springer-Verlag.



FAU-Autorinnen und Autoren / FAU-Herausgeberinnen und Herausgeber

Egger, Christoph
Lehrstuhl für Informatik 13 (Angewandte Kryptographie)


Zitierweisen

APA:
Egger, C., Schlumberger, J., Kruegel, C., & Vigna, G. (2013). Practical attacks against the I2P network. In Proceedings of the 16th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses, RAID 2013 (pp. 432-451). Rodney Bay.

MLA:
Egger, Christoph, et al. "Practical attacks against the I2P network." Proceedings of the 16th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses, RAID 2013, Rodney Bay 2013. 432-451.

BibTeX: 

Zuletzt aktualisiert 2019-01-08 um 07:15