Mechanisms for Efficient Voting with Private Information about Preferences

Journal article

Publication Details

Author(s): Engelmann D, Grimm V
Journal: Economic Journal
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
Publication year: 2012
Volume: 122
Journal issue: 563
Pages range: 1010-1041
ISSN: 0013-0133


In games of conflict, players typically have an incentive to exaggerate their interests. This concerns issues ranging from negotiations between political parties to conflict resolution within marriages. We experimentally study this problem using a simple voting game where information about preferences is private. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences. The exogenous linking mechanism by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) captures nearly all achievable efficiency gains. Repeated interaction in various settings, which could allow endogenous linking mechanisms to evolve, leads to significant gains in truthful representation and efficiency only when players can choose their partners. © 2012 The Author(s). The Economic Journal © 2012 Royal Economic Society.

FAU Authors / FAU Editors

Grimm, Veronika Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie

External institutions with authors

Universität Mannheim

How to cite

Engelmann, D., & Grimm, V. (2012). Mechanisms for Efficient Voting with Private Information about Preferences. Economic Journal, 122(563), 1010-1041.

Engelmann, Dirk, and Veronika Grimm. "Mechanisms for Efficient Voting with Private Information about Preferences." Economic Journal 122.563 (2012): 1010-1041.


Last updated on 2018-09-08 at 17:23