Physician behavior under prospective payment schemes: Evidence from artefactual field and lab experiments

Hafner L, Reif S, Seebauer M (2017)


Publication Language: English

Publication Type: Other publication type

Publication year: 2017

Series: FAU Discussion Papers in Economics No. 18-2017

URI: https://www.iwf.rw.fau.de/files/2017/10/18-2017.pdf

Abstract

Recent experimental studies analyze the behavior of physicians towards patients and €find that physicians care for their own pro€fit as well as patient benefi€t. In this paper, we extend the experimental analysis of the physician decision problem by adding a third party representing the health insurance which €finances medical service provision. Our results show that physicians take into account the payoff‚s of the third party, which can lead to underprovision of medical services. We conduct a laboratory experiment in neutral as well as medical framing using students and medical doctors as subjects. Subjects in the medically framed experiments behave weakly more patient orientated in contrast to neutral framing. A sample of medical doctors exhibits comparable behavior to students with medical framing.

Authors with CRIS profile

How to cite

APA:

Hafner, L., Reif, S., & Seebauer, M. (2017). Physician behavior under prospective payment schemes: Evidence from artefactual field and lab experiments.

MLA:

Hafner, Lucas, Simon Reif, and Michael Seebauer. Physician behavior under prospective payment schemes: Evidence from artefactual field and lab experiments. 2017.

BibTeX: Download