Physician behavior under prospective payment schemes: Evidence from artefactual field and lab experiments

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Publication Details

Author(s): Hafner L, Reif S, Seebauer M
Publication year: 2017
Title of series: FAU Discussion Papers in Economics No. 18-2017
Language: English


Abstract


Recent experimental studies analyze the behavior of physicians towards patients and €nd that physicians care for their own pro€t as well as patient bene€t. In this paper, we extend the experimental analysis of the physician decision problem by adding a third party representing the health insurance which €nances medical service provision. Our results show that physicians take into account the payo‚s of the third party, which can lead to underprovision of medical services. We conduct a laboratory experiment in neutral as well as medical framing using students and medical doctors as subjects. Subjects in the medically framed experiments behave weakly more patient orientated in contrast to neutral framing. A sample of medical

doctors exhibits comparable behavior to students with medical framing.



FAU Authors / FAU Editors

Hafner, Lucas
Professur für Gesundheitsökonomie
Reif, Simon
Professur für Gesundheitsökonomie
Seebauer, Michael Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie


How to cite

APA:
Hafner, L., Reif, S., & Seebauer, M. (2017). Physician behavior under prospective payment schemes: Evidence from artefactual field and lab experiments.

MLA:
Hafner, Lucas, Simon Reif, and Michael Seebauer. Physician behavior under prospective payment schemes: Evidence from artefactual field and lab experiments. 2017.

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Last updated on 2018-06-08 at 11:21