Rent Extraction and Prosocial Behavior

Unpublished / Preprint
(Accepted)


Publication Details

Author(s): Cagala T, Glogowsky U, Grimm V, Rincke J, Tuset Cueva A
Publication year: 2019
Language: English


Abstract

We present controlled experimental evidence on how rent extraction by an administrator affects giving
to non-profit associations. Holding the price of giving constant, we compare contributions between
two conditions: a rent-extraction condition, in which an administrator can expropriate a part of the
contributions and a control condition without rent extraction. We find that rent extraction strongly
reduces average contributions. Studying the channels through which this effect operates, we demonstrate that rent extraction has situational spillovers, suggesting that it undermines the contributors’
general preference for giving. In contrast, we do not find evidence for negative reciprocity towards the
administrator.


FAU Authors / FAU Editors

Cagala, Tobias
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik
Glogowsky, Ulrich
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik
Grimm, Veronika Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie
Rincke, Johannes Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik
Tuset Cueva, Amanda
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik

Last updated on 2019-16-08 at 11:08