On the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality
Schmidt S (2019)
Publication Language: English
Publication Type: Conference contribution, Conference Contribution
Publication year: 2019
Event location: Denver (Colorado, USA)
Abstract
We
should not always be epistemically rational. I argue that this follows from the
following principle which I defend: If you ought to cause yourself not
to believe that p, then it is false that you ought to believe that p. The
evidentialist would object that it is always epistemically required to
be epistemically rational. The defender of the normativity of rationality would
object that, insofar as we are personally criticizable for being
irrational, we are always required to be epistemically rational. I reject both
objections and distinguish different senses of ‘being normatively required’ in
order to clarify in what sense we ought to be epistemically rational, and in
what sense we are sometimes allowed not to be.
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How to cite
APA:
Schmidt, S. (2019). On the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality. In Proceedings of the 2019 Central Division Meeting der American Philosophical Association (APA). Denver (Colorado, USA), US.
MLA:
Schmidt, Sebastian. "On the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality." Proceedings of the 2019 Central Division Meeting der American Philosophical Association (APA), Denver (Colorado, USA) 2019.
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