Reputation formation with competitive investors

Other publication type

Publication Details

Author(s): Abraham M, Grimm V, Neeß C, Seebauer M
Publication year: 2018
Language: English


We investigate patterns
of information transmission and its effects on transfer and return rates in a standard
investment game where investors compete in a tournament and costless reputational
information about responders can be exchanged between individual investors within
a population but does not become public. We vary the nature of information that
could be transmitted (either a subjective rating or the objective details of a
transaction) and compare the level of information exchange to a treatment
without competition among investors. We find that competition among investors decreases
information transmission substantially and significantly, but the nature of
information only affects information transmission decisions without competition.
When investors compete they exhibit lower transfer rates and profits, while
responders return lower rates and are only able to significantly increase their
profits when information is objective. We find evidence that in a competitive environment
investors deliberately use subjective information to mislead their competitors.

FAU Authors / FAU Editors

Abraham, Martin Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Soziologie und Empirische Sozialforschung (Schwerpunkt Arbeitsmarktsoziologie)
Grimm, Veronika Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie
Neeß, Christina Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Empirische Wirtschaftssoziologie
Seebauer, Michael Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie

How to cite

Abraham, M., Grimm, V., Neeß, C., & Seebauer, M. (2018). Reputation formation with competitive investors.

Abraham, Martin, et al. Reputation formation with competitive investors. 2018.


Last updated on 2019-10-04 at 21:38

Share link