Re-evaluating New Evidentialism

Schmidt S (2018)

Publication Language: English

Publication Type: Conference contribution, Abstract of a poster

Publication year: 2018

Event location: Köln DE

Abstract

The aim of this talk is to shed light on the normativity of epistemic reasons. It is a well-known problem that beliefs are not voluntarily controlled (unlike actions), and that we are thus in need of an explanation of how there can be normative reasons for belief,[1] or responsibility for belief.[2] In this talk, I argue that, over and above this problem, there are at least two further reasons for doubting the status of epistemic reasons as genuine normative reasons. Before stating these further reasons, however, I reject two recent objections against evidentialism which center around Shah’s new argument for evidentialism (2006). These objections either deny the deliberative constraint on reasons (Rinard 2015), or they deny that this constraint excludes pragmatic reasons for belief (McCormick 2015, 28f). Although these objections fail, they contain an insight which motivates my arguments that epistemic reasons are not genuinely normative.[3] The objections draw our attention towards differences between reasons for actions and epistemic reasons. In contrast to reasons for actions, epistemic reasons do not always amount to criticizability of the subject who does not respond correctly to sufficiently strong epistemic reasons, and, secondly, are not authoritative in situations where epistemic reasons and reasons for actions clash. The upshot is that neither evidentialism nor pragmatism, as traditionally understood, correctly capture the normativity of belief. In conclusion, I hint towards a more adequate understanding of normativity.


[1] See, e.g., Alston 1988; Chrisman 2016.

[2] See, e.g., McCormick 2015.

[3] As assumed by evidentialists, see Bykvist/Hattiangandi 2007, 277f.

Authors with CRIS profile

Sebastian Schmidt Lehrstuhl für Philosophie

How to cite

APA:

Schmidt, S. (2018). Re-evaluating New Evidentialism. Poster presentation at 10. Kongress der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie (GAP 10), Köln, DE.

MLA:

Schmidt, Sebastian. "Re-evaluating New Evidentialism." Presented at 10. Kongress der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie (GAP 10), Köln 2018.

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