Sellars and Quine on Empiricism and Conceptual Truth

Journal article
(Original article)


Publication Details

Author(s): Brandt S
Journal: British Journal for the History of Philosophy
Publication year: 2016
ISSN: 0960-8788
Language: English


Abstract


I compare Sellars’s criticism of the ‘myth of the given’ with Quine’s criticism of the ‘two dogmas’ of empiricism, that is, the analytic–synthetic distinction and reductionism. In Sections I to III, I present Quine’s and Sellars’s views. In IV to X, I discuss similarities and differences in their views. In XI to XII, I show that Sellars’s arguments against the ‘myth of the given’ are incompatible with Quine’s rejection of the analytic–synthetic distinction.



FAU Authors / FAU Editors

Brandt, Stefan Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Philosophie


How to cite

APA:
Brandt, S. (2016). Sellars and Quine on Empiricism and Conceptual Truth. British Journal for the History of Philosophy. https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2016.1225566

MLA:
Brandt, Stefan. "Sellars and Quine on Empiricism and Conceptual Truth." British Journal for the History of Philosophy (2016).

BibTeX: 

Last updated on 2018-19-04 at 03:41