Implementing efficient market structure

Journal article


Publication Details

Author(s): Grimm V, Riedel F, Wolfstetter E
Journal: Review of Economic Design
Publisher: Springer Verlag (Germany)
Publication year: 2003
Volume: 7
Journal issue: 4
Pages range: 443-463
ISSN: 1434-4742


Abstract


This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in

natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior

of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke–Groves mechanism,

characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the weighted sum of expected

social surplus and expected tax revenue, and show that these mechanisms avoid

budget deficits and prevent excessive entry.



FAU Authors / FAU Editors

Grimm, Veronika Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie


How to cite

APA:
Grimm, V., Riedel, F., & Wolfstetter, E. (2003). Implementing efficient market structure. Review of Economic Design, 7(4), 443-463. https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s100580300087

MLA:
Grimm, Veronika, Frank Riedel, and Elmar Wolfstetter. "Implementing efficient market structure." Review of Economic Design 7.4 (2003): 443-463.

BibTeX: 

Last updated on 2018-20-07 at 01:23

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