Shared Tax Sources and Public Expenditures

Journal article


Publication Details

Author(s): Wrede M
Journal: International Tax and Public Finance
Publisher: Springer Verlag (Germany)
Publication year: 2000
Volume: 7
Pages range: 163-175
ISSN: 0927-5940
Language: English


Abstract


This paper deals with a specific vertical assignment of public functions in a federation: Two levels of government share both the same tax source and expenditure on a productivity increasing public service. We consider surplus maximizing Leviathan governments which provide public services in order to increase their potential tax base. The Nash equilibrium is characterized by overtaxation and relative to surplus maximization—depending on whether or not the public goods are sufficiently complementary with the entire tax base—either  underprovision or overprovision of the public service. The implications of these results, in terms of welfare and potential use for earmarking taxes are also considered.



FAU Authors / FAU Editors

Wrede, Matthias Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Sozialpolitik


How to cite

APA:
Wrede, M. (2000). Shared Tax Sources and Public Expenditures. International Tax and Public Finance, 7, 163-175. https://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008752403978

MLA:
Wrede, Matthias. "Shared Tax Sources and Public Expenditures." International Tax and Public Finance 7 (2000): 163-175.

BibTeX: 

Last updated on 2018-19-04 at 03:02