The third generation (UMTS) spectrum license auction in Germany

Article in Edited Volumes


Publication Details

Author(s): Grimm V, Riedel F, Wolfstetter E
Editor(s): G. Illing
Title edited volumes: Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunication
Publisher: MIT Press
Publishing place: Cambridge, MA
Publication year: 2004
Pages range: 223-246
ISBN: 0-262-09037-6


Abstract


The second–generation (GSM) spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid multi-unit auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a game theoretic explanation of low price equilibrium in simultaneous, ascending-bid multi-unit auctions. In particular, it is shown that in the unique equilibrium that survives iterated elimination of dominated strategies, the efficient allocation is reached at minimum bids.



FAU Authors / FAU Editors

Grimm, Veronika Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie


How to cite

APA:
Grimm, V., Riedel, F., & Wolfstetter, E. (2004). The third generation (UMTS) spectrum license auction in Germany. In G. Illing (Eds.), Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunication (pp. 223-246). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

MLA:
Grimm, Veronika, Frank Riedel, and Elmar Wolfstetter. "The third generation (UMTS) spectrum license auction in Germany." Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunication Ed. G. Illing, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004. 223-246.

BibTeX: 

Last updated on 2018-19-04 at 02:57