The third generation (UMTS) spectrum license auction in Germany

Grimm V, Riedel F, Wolfstetter E (2004)


Publication Type: Book chapter / Article in edited volumes

Publication year: 2004

Publisher: MIT Press

Edited Volumes: Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunication

City/Town: Cambridge, MA

Pages Range: 223-246

ISBN: 0-262-09037-6

URI: http://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=WHrpLC67FgMC&oi=fnd&pg=PA223&dq=%22Spectrum+Auctions+and+Competition+in+Telecommunications%22+&ots=lET01rF9dh&sig=m0S25NvIxFkeCbyCVrj_O2pBJeE#v=onepage&q&f=false

Abstract

The second–generation (GSM) spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid multi-unit auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a game theoretic explanation of low price equilibrium in simultaneous, ascending-bid multi-unit auctions. In particular, it is shown that in the unique equilibrium that survives iterated elimination of dominated strategies, the efficient allocation is reached at minimum bids.

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How to cite

APA:

Grimm, V., Riedel, F., & Wolfstetter, E. (2004). The third generation (UMTS) spectrum license auction in Germany. In G. Illing (Eds.), Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunication. (pp. 223-246). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

MLA:

Grimm, Veronika, Frank Riedel, and Elmar Wolfstetter. "The third generation (UMTS) spectrum license auction in Germany." Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunication. Ed. G. Illing, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004. 223-246.

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