Fiel-Experimental Evidence on Unethical Behaviour Under Commitment

Other publication type


Publication Details

Author(s): Cagala T, Glogowsky U, Rincke J
Publication year: 2016
Language: English


Abstract


To prevent fraud and unethical behavior, many firms request that managers and employees commit to a code of conduct. Studying the cheating behavior of future managers and firm employees on exams, this paper provides field-experimental evidence regarding the effectiveness of such commitment requests. Our main results are as follows. First, commitment to a no-cheating rule shifts subjects’ attitudes toward unethical behavior and strengthens their aversion to cheating. Second, whereas close monitoring eliminates cheating, requesting commitment to a no-cheating rule has strongly heterogeneous effects. Commit-ment reduces cheating if monitoring is sufficiently strong, but it is ineffective or may even backfire if monitoring is weak. This indicates that requesting com-mitment to a no-cheating rule is effective only if enforcement-related policies



FAU Authors / FAU Editors

Cagala, Tobias
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik
Glogowsky, Ulrich
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik
Rincke, Johannes Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik


How to cite

APA:
Cagala, T., Glogowsky, U., & Rincke, J. (2016). Fiel-Experimental Evidence on Unethical Behaviour Under Commitment.

MLA:
Cagala, Tobias, Ulrich Glogowsky, and Johannes Rincke. Fiel-Experimental Evidence on Unethical Behaviour Under Commitment. 2016.

BibTeX: 

Last updated on 2018-19-04 at 03:00