How Not to Read Philosophical Investigations: McDowell and Goldfarb on Wittgenstein on Understanding

Brandt S (2014)


Publication Language: English

Publication Type: Journal article, Original article

Publication year: 2014

Journal

Publisher: Basil Blackwell

Book Volume: 37

Pages Range: 289 - 311

Journal Issue: 4

DOI: 10.1111/phin.12062

Abstract

 

In a recent article, John McDowell has criticised Warren Goldfarb for attributing an anti-realist conception of linguistic understanding to Wittgenstein. I argue that McDowell is right to reject Goldfarb’s anti- realism, but does so for the wrong reasons. I show that both Goldfarb’s and McDowell’s interpretations are vitiated by the fact that they do not pay attention to Wittgenstein’s positive claims about understanding, in particular his claim that understanding is a kind of ability. The cause of this oversight lies in their endorsement of an excessively anti-systematic or “therapeutic” reading of Wittgenstein. 

 

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How to cite

APA:

Brandt, S. (2014). How Not to Read Philosophical Investigations: McDowell and Goldfarb on Wittgenstein on Understanding. Philosophical Investigations, 37(4), 289 - 311. https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phin.12062

MLA:

Brandt, Stefan. "How Not to Read Philosophical Investigations: McDowell and Goldfarb on Wittgenstein on Understanding." Philosophical Investigations 37.4 (2014): 289 - 311.

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