Matching technology and the choice of punishment institutions in a prisoner’s dilemma game

Journal article


Publication Details

Author(s): Grimm V, Mengel F
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Publisher: Elsevier
Publication year: 2011
Volume: 78
Journal issue: 3
Pages range: 333-348
ISSN: 0167-2681
Language: English


Abstract


We experimentally investigate the effect of endogenous matching within a segmented population on peoples’ willingness to cooperate as well as their attitudes towards cooperative norms. In the experiment participants can repeatedly choose between two groups, where in one of them a (local) punishment institution fosters cooperation. The degree of population viscosity (i.e. the extent to which matching is biased towards within-group interactions) is varied across treatments. We find that both, the share of participants that choose into the group with the punishment institution and the share of participants that cooperate, increase monotonically with the degree of population viscosity. Furthermore – with higher population viscosity – significantly more subjects claim to support a punishment institution in a post-experimental questionnaire.



FAU Authors / FAU Editors

Grimm, Veronika Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie


How to cite

APA:
Grimm, V., & Mengel, F. (2011). Matching technology and the choice of punishment institutions in a prisoner’s dilemma game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 78(3), 333-348. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.01.018

MLA:
Grimm, Veronika, and Friederike Mengel. "Matching technology and the choice of punishment institutions in a prisoner’s dilemma game." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 78.3 (2011): 333-348.

BibTeX: 

Last updated on 2018-04-07 at 23:23