Electoral competition and endogenous barriers to entry

Drometer M, Rincke J (2014)

Publication Language: English

Publication Type: Journal article

Publication year: 2014

Journal

European Journal of Political Economy Elsevier

Publisher: Elsevier

Book Volume: 34

Pages Range: 253-262

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.02.003

Abstract

As institutions matter for political and economic outcomes, they are (at least partly) shaped by the interests of political agents acting under these limitations. However, empirical evidence documenting such endogenous change of institutions is scarce. We address the issue by examining the link between the degree of electoral competition and the design of ballot access restrictions in the United States. Exploiting exogenous variation in electoral competition at the state level induced by the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965, our main finding is that ballot access rules have been systematically tightened in response to stronger electoral competition.

Authors with CRIS profile

Johannes Rincke Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik

Involved external institutions

Münchener Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wirtschaftswissenschaft - CESifo GmbH DE Germany (DE)

How to cite

APA:

Drometer, M., & Rincke, J. (2014). Electoral competition and endogenous barriers to entry. European Journal of Political Economy, 34, 253-262. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.02.003

MLA:

Drometer, Marcus, and Johannes Rincke. "Electoral competition and endogenous barriers to entry." European Journal of Political Economy 34 (2014): 253-262.

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