Electoral competition and endogenous barriers to entry

Journal article


Publication Details

Author(s): Drometer M, Rincke J
Journal: European Journal of Political Economy
Publisher: Elsevier
Publication year: 2014
Volume: 34
Pages range: 253-262
ISSN: 0176-2680
Language: English


Abstract


As institutions matter for political and economic outcomes, they are (at least partly) shaped by the interests of political agents acting under these limitations. However, empirical evidence documenting such endogenous change of institutions is scarce. We address the issue by examining the link between the degree of electoral competition and the design of ballot access restrictions in the United States. Exploiting exogenous variation in electoral competition at the state level induced by the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965, our main finding is that ballot access rules have been systematically tightened in response to stronger electoral competition.



FAU Authors / FAU Editors

Rincke, Johannes Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik


How to cite

APA:
Drometer, M., & Rincke, J. (2014). Electoral competition and endogenous barriers to entry. European Journal of Political Economy, 34, 253-262. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.02.003

MLA:
Drometer, Marcus, and Johannes Rincke. "Electoral competition and endogenous barriers to entry." European Journal of Political Economy 34 (2014): 253-262.

BibTeX: 

Last updated on 2018-19-04 at 02:45