Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement

Journal article


Publication Details

Author(s): Grimm V
Journal: Journal of Economics
Publisher: Springer Verlag (Germany)
Publication year: 2007
Volume: 90
Journal issue: 1
Pages range: 1-27
ISSN: 0931-8658


Abstract


We compare sequential and bundle procurement auctions in a framework of successive procurement situations, where current success positively or negatively affects future market opportunities. We find that in bundle auctions procurement cost is lower and less risky than in sequential standard auctions, but still higher than in the optimal sequential auction. Only a sequential second price auction leads to the efficient outcome.



FAU Authors / FAU Editors

Grimm, Veronika Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie


How to cite

APA:
Grimm, V. (2007). Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement. Journal of Economics, 90(1), 1-27. https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-006-0225-3

MLA:
Grimm, Veronika. "Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement." Journal of Economics 90.1 (2007): 1-27.

BibTeX: 

Last updated on 2018-19-04 at 02:44