Enforcement Spillovers

Rincke J, Traxler C (2011)

Publication Language: English

Publication Type: Journal article

Publication year: 2011

Journal

Review of Economics and Statistics Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press (MIT Press): Economics Titles

Publisher: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press (MIT Press): Economics Titles

Book Volume: 93

Pages Range: 1224-1234

Journal Issue: 4

DOI: 10.1162/REST_a_00128

Abstract

This paper identifies spillovers from law enforcement. Our approach makes use of microdata on compliance with TV license fees that allow us to distinguish between households that were subject to enforcement and those that were not. Using snowfall as an instrument for local inspections, we find a striking response of households to increased enforcement in their vicinity: on average, three detections make one additional household comply with the law. As compliance rises significantly among those who had no exposure to field inspections, our findings establish a sizable externality in enforcement.

Authors with CRIS profile

Johannes Rincke Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik

Involved external institutions

Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Gemeinschaftsgütern (MPI-EG) / Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods DE Germany (DE)

How to cite

APA:

Rincke, J., & Traxler, C. (2011). Enforcement Spillovers. Review of Economics and Statistics, 93(4), 1224-1234. https://dx.doi.org/10.1162/REST_a_00128

MLA:

Rincke, Johannes, and Christian Traxler. "Enforcement Spillovers." Review of Economics and Statistics 93.4 (2011): 1224-1234.

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