Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany.

Journal article


Publication Details

Author(s): Grimm V, Riedel F, Wolfstetter E
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization
Publisher: Elsevier
Publication year: 2003
Volume: 21
Journal issue: 10
Pages range: 1557 - 1569
ISSN: 0167-7187


Abstract


The second–generation (GSM) spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid multi-unit auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a game theoretic explanation of low price equilibrium in simultaneous, ascending-bid multi-unit auctions. In particular, it is shown that in the unique equilibrium that survives iterated elimination of dominated strategies, the efficient allocation is reached at minimum bids.



FAU Authors / FAU Editors

Grimm, Veronika Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie


How to cite

APA:
Grimm, V., Riedel, F., & Wolfstetter, E. (2003). Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21(10), 1557 - 1569. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-7187(03)00058-4

MLA:
Grimm, Veronika, Frank Riedel, and Elmar Wolfstetter. "Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany." International Journal of Industrial Organization 21.10 (2003): 1557 - 1569.

BibTeX: 

Last updated on 2018-14-07 at 20:10