Bidding Behaviour in Multi-Unit Auctions – An Experimental Investigation

Journal article


Publication Details

Author(s): Engelmann D, Grimm V
Journal: The Economic Journal
Publisher: Wiley-VCH Verlag
Publication year: 2009
Volume: 119
Journal issue: 537
Pages range: 855-882
ISSN: 0013-0133


Abstract


We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with flat demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. We also test revenue equivalence for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units.



FAU Authors / FAU Editors

Grimm, Veronika Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie


How to cite

APA:
Engelmann, D., & Grimm, V. (2009). Bidding Behaviour in Multi-Unit Auctions – An Experimental Investigation. The Economic Journal, 119(537), 855-882. https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02249.x

MLA:
Engelmann, Dirk, and Veronika Grimm. "Bidding Behaviour in Multi-Unit Auctions – An Experimental Investigation." The Economic Journal 119.537 (2009): 855-882.

BibTeX: 

Last updated on 2018-19-04 at 02:44