The minimum wage from a two-sided perspective

Journal article


Publication Details

Author(s): Merkl C, Snower D, Brown AJG
Journal: Economics letters
Publisher: Elsevier
Publication year: 2014
Volume: 124
Journal issue: 3
Pages range: 389-391
ISSN: 0165-1765
Language: English


Abstract


This paper sheds new light on the effects of the minimum wage on employment from a two-sided theoretical perspective, in which firms' job offer and workers' job acceptance decisions are disentangled. Minimum wages reduce job offer incentives and increase job acceptance incentives. We show that sufficiently low minimum wages may do no harm to employment, since their job-offer disincentives are countervailed by their job-acceptance incentives.



FAU Authors / FAU Editors

Merkl, Christian Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Makroökonomik


How to cite

APA:
Merkl, C., Snower, D., & Brown, A.J.G. (2014). The minimum wage from a two-sided perspective. Economics letters, 124(3), 389-391. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.06.020

MLA:
Merkl, Christian, Dennis Snower, and Alessio J. G. Brown. "The minimum wage from a two-sided perspective." Economics letters 124.3 (2014): 389-391.

BibTeX: 

Last updated on 2018-08-07 at 12:23