Tragedy of the Fiscal Common?: Fiscal Stock Externalities in a Leviathan Model of Federalism.

Journal article


Publication Details

Author(s): Wrede M
Journal: Public Choice
Publisher: Springer Verlag (Germany)
Publication year: 1999
Volume: 101
Pages range: 177-193
ISSN: 0048-5829
Language: English


Abstract


The paper deals with vertical tax competition between self-interested governments in a dynamic environment. In a federation, competition between the federal and the state governments arises when tax sources are not separated but pooled. Since dynamic inefficiencies will be stressed, the focus is on fiscal stock externalities rather than on flow externalities. The paper shows that the Leviathans in a federation tax the fiscal common resource more extensively than the single Leviathan in a unitary state. Furthermore, the positive impact of political stability on public consumption of the fiscal common will be discussed.



FAU Authors / FAU Editors

Wrede, Matthias Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Sozialpolitik


How to cite

APA:
Wrede, M. (1999). Tragedy of the Fiscal Common?: Fiscal Stock Externalities in a Leviathan Model of Federalism. Public Choice, 101, 177-193.

MLA:
Wrede, Matthias. "Tragedy of the Fiscal Common?: Fiscal Stock Externalities in a Leviathan Model of Federalism." Public Choice 101 (1999): 177-193.

BibTeX: 

Last updated on 2018-19-04 at 03:02