Yardstick Competition to Tame the Leviathan

Journal article

Publication Details

Author(s): Wrede M
Journal: European Journal of Political Economy
Publisher: Elsevier
Publication year: 2001
Volume: 17
Pages range: 705-721
ISSN: 0176-2680
Language: English


This papers analyzes the disciplining role of elections under asymmetric information, when voters can rely on relative performance evaluation to tame a Leviathan. When elections are held in different regions, voters are able to reduce political rents below the Leviathan level by retrospective voting strategies. The paper compares a multi-candidate model with a two-party system with either independent or coordinated policies in the various jurisdictions. In general, voters prefer the multi-candidate system. However, the disciplining ability of voters under the two-party system is strengthened if each party has a uniform leadership that determines policies in all regions.

FAU Authors / FAU Editors

Wrede, Matthias Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Sozialpolitik

How to cite

Wrede, M. (2001). Yardstick Competition to Tame the Leviathan. European Journal of Political Economy, 17, 705-721. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0176-2680(01)00052-0

Wrede, Matthias. "Yardstick Competition to Tame the Leviathan." European Journal of Political Economy 17 (2001): 705-721.


Last updated on 2018-19-04 at 03:02