Vertical Externalities and Control of Politicians

Journal article


Publication Details

Author(s): Wrede M
Journal: Economics of Governance
Publisher: Springer Verlag
Publication year: 2002
Volume: 3
Pages range: 135-151
ISSN: 1435-6104
eISSN: 1435-8131
Language: English


Abstract


A major role of (repeated) elections is to create incentives for politicians to act in the interests of voters. This paper considers the disciplining role of elections in countries with either one or two levels of government. Simple retrospective voting strategies which are based on cut-off levels with respect to expenditure and tax rates are considered. It is shown that the power of voters

is weakened if a second independent level of government is added. However, voters can partially reinforce their power by making politicians not only liable for their own policy, but also for the policy carried out at each other level of government.



FAU Authors / FAU Editors

Wrede, Matthias Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Sozialpolitik


How to cite

APA:
Wrede, M. (2002). Vertical Externalities and Control of Politicians. Economics of Governance, 3, 135-151. https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s101010100035

MLA:
Wrede, Matthias. "Vertical Externalities and Control of Politicians." Economics of Governance 3 (2002): 135-151.

BibTeX: 

Last updated on 2018-16-06 at 06:10