Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivations for Tax Compliance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Germany

Journal article


Publication Details

Author(s): Dwenger N, Kleven H, Rasul I, Rincke J
Journal: American Economic Journal-Economic Policy
Publisher: American Economic Association
Publication year: 2016
Volume: 8
Journal issue: 3
Pages range: 203-232
ISSN: 1945-7731
Language: English


Abstract


We study extrinsic and intrinsic motivations for tax compliance in the context of a local church tax in Germany. This tax system has historically relied on zero deterrence so that any compliance at baseline is intrinsically motivated. Starting from this zero deterrence baseline, we implement a field experiment that incentivized compliance through deterrence or rewards. Using administrative records of taxes paid and true tax liabilities, we use these treatments to document that intrinsically motivated compliance is substantial, that a significant fraction of it may be driven by duty-to-comply preferences, and that there is no crowd-out between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations.



FAU Authors / FAU Editors

Rincke, Johannes Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik


How to cite

APA:
Dwenger, N., Kleven, H., Rasul, I., & Rincke, J. (2016). Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivations for Tax Compliance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Germany. American Economic Journal-Economic Policy, 8(3), 203-232. https://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150083

MLA:
Dwenger, Nadja, et al. "Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivations for Tax Compliance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Germany." American Economic Journal-Economic Policy 8.3 (2016): 203-232.

BibTeX: 

Last updated on 2018-12-06 at 10:23