An Incentive Theory of Matching

Journal article


Publication Details

Author(s): Merkl C, Snower D, Brown AJG
Journal: Macroeconomic Dynamics
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Publication year: 2015
Volume: 19
Journal issue: 3
Pages range: 1-26
ISSN: 1365-1005
Language: English


Abstract


This paper presents a theory of the labor market matching process in terms of incentive-based, two-sided search among heterogeneous agents. The matching process is decomposed into its two component stages: the contact stage, in which job searchers make contact with employers, and the selection stage, in which they decide whether to match. We construct a theoretical model explaining two-sided selection through microeconomic incentives. Firms face adjustment costs in responding to heterogeneous variations in the characteristics of workers and jobs. Matches and separations are described through firms' job offer and firing decisions and workers' job acceptance and quit decisions. Our calibrated model for the United States can account for important empirical regularities, such as the large volatilities of labor market variables, that the conventional matching model cannot.



FAU Authors / FAU Editors

Merkl, Christian Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Makroökonomik


How to cite

APA:
Merkl, C., Snower, D., & Brown, A.J.G. (2015). An Incentive Theory of Matching. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 19(3), 1-26. https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1365100513000527

MLA:
Merkl, Christian, Dennis Snower, and Alessio J. G. Brown. "An Incentive Theory of Matching." Macroeconomic Dynamics 19.3 (2015): 1-26.

BibTeX: 

Last updated on 2018-12-06 at 04:10