% Encoding: UTF-8
@COMMENT{BibTeX export based on data in FAU CRIS: https://cris.fau.de/}
@COMMENT{For any questions please write to cris-support@fau.de}
@misc{faucris.121259204,
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Zöttl, Gregor},
faupublication = {no},
note = {WiSo-Import:2015-08-12:4985},
title = {{Access} to {Commitment} {Devices} {Reduces} {Investment} {Incentives} in {Oligopoly}},
year = {2005}
}
@article{faucris.204075926,
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Schewe, Lars and Schmidt, Martin and Zöttl, Gregor},
doi = {10.1007/s00186-018-0647-z},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {Mathematical Methods of Operations Research},
pages = {223–255},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{A} multilevel model of the {European} entry-exit gas market},
volume = {89},
year = {2019}
}
@article{faucris.109016644,
abstract = {We experimentally investigate a Bertrand market with homogenous goods in which sellers can announce the donation of a share of their profits to an existing non-profit organization. In a 2 × 2 design, we vary the credibility of announcements and the efficiency of the contributions to the public fund. We find that sellers’ donations are strictly positive independently of the credibility of the announcements, and their donations are higher if announcements are credible and efficiency is high. However, market outcomes in terms of prices and profits do not differ significantly in any treatment that allows for contributions to a public fund. Analysis of buyer decisions reveals that prices are the main driver of purchase decisions while higher donations only affect purchase decisions when they are credible and price differences are negligible. Our results indicate that under intense competition the possibility of attracting customers through corporate social responsibility activities is limited, although the constant positive level of contributions suggests that norms lead to a certain minimum level of corporate social responsibilit},
author = {Feicht, Robert and Grimm, Veronika and Seebauer, Michael},
doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2015.11.005},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization},
keywords = {Corporate social responsibility;Competition;Charitable giving;Experiment},
pages = {88-101},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{An} experimental study of corporate social responsibility through charitable giving in {Bertrand} markets},
volume = {124},
year = {2016}
}
@article{faucris.111134584,
abstract = {In theory, efficiency and compliance levels induced by an emission trading system should not depend on the initial allocation mechanism for permits in the absence of transaction costs. In a laboratory experiment we investigate this prediction by comparing frequent and infrequent auctioning as well as two different grandfathering schemes under market rules that closely resemble those of the European Union Emission Trading System. Our experimental results suggest that, contrary to theoretical predictions, the initial allocation procedure has the potential to affect efficiency of the final permit allocation. While we do not identify an effect of the initial allocation procedure itself (auction vs. grandfathering), we observe higher final efficiency after infrequent auctioning of permits than for frequent auctioning. Surprisingly, for a grandfathering scheme that distributes permits proportional to expected needs the high initial efficiency is substantially reduced by secondary market trading. An analysis of behavioral patterns shows that permit prices and abatement levels are initially substantially higher if permits are allocated by auction and we also find more over-banking as compared to the grandfathering treatments. Treatment differences diminish in the course of the experiment.},
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Ilieva, Lyuba},
doi = {10.1007/s11149-013-9222-y},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {Journal of Regulatory Economics},
keywords = {Emissions trading; Auction; Grandfathering; Experiment},
pages = {308-338},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{An} experiment on emissions trading: the effect of different allocation mechanisms},
volume = {44},
year = {2013}
}
@article{faucris.114290044,
abstract = {We study how players learn to make decisions if they face many different games. Games are drawn randomly from a set of either two or six games in each of 100 rounds. If either there are few games or if extensive summary information is provided (or both) convergence to the unique Nash equilibrium generally occurs. Otherwise this is not the case. We demonstrate that there are learning spillovers across games but participants learn to play strategically equivalent games in the same way. Our design and analysis allow us to distinguish between different sources of complexity and theoretical models of categorization. © 2012 Elsevier Inc.},
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Mengel, Friederike},
doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.011},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
keywords = {Experiments; Game theory; Learning; Multiple games},
note = {WiSo-Import:2015-03-26:1140},
pages = {2220-2259},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{An} experiment on learning in a multiple games environment},
volume = {147},
year = {2012}
}
@article{faucris.117534384,
abstract = {We experimentally investigate key predictions of supply function equilibrium. While, overall, equilibrium organizes bidding behavior well, we observe three important deviations. First, bidding is sensitive to theoretically irrelevant changes of the demand distribution. Second, in a market with symmetric firms we observe tacit collusion in that firms provide less than the predicted quantities. Third, in a market with asymmetric capacities, the larger firm bids more competitively than predicted, while the smaller firms still provide less than equilibrium quantities.},
author = {Bolle, Friedel and Grimm, Veronika and Ockenfels, Axel and del Pozo, Xavier},
doi = {10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.06.006},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {European Economic Review},
keywords = {Supply function competition; Experiment; Demand uncertainty; Asymmetric firms},
pages = {170-185},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{An} experiment on supply function competition},
volume = {63},
year = {2013}
}
@misc{faucris.269388343,
abstract = {We analyze Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems (GNEPs) for which the
objectives of the individuals are interdependent and shared constraints
are governed by a system of partial differential equations (PDEs). This
allows us to model the strategic interaction of competing firms, which
explicitly take into account the dynamics of transporting a commodity,
such as natural gas, through a network. We establish existence of a
variational equilibrium, which solves the considered GNEP. We identify a
reformulation of the original equilibrium problem that is suited to
derive and establish a solution algorithm. Based on the solutions for a
test instance, we finally illustrate how our results can be used to
analyze dynamic aspects such as linepack in the context of liberalized
gas market},
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Hintermüller, Michael and Huber, Oliver and Schewe, Lars and Schmidt, Martin and Zöttl, Gregor},
faupublication = {yes},
peerreviewed = {automatic},
title = {{A} {PDE}-{Constrained} {Generalized} {Nash} {Equilibrium} {Approach} for {Modeling} {Gas} {Markets} with {Transport}},
url = {https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-trr154/frontdoor/index/index/start/14/rows/10/sortfield/score/sortorder/desc/searchtype/simple/query/zöttl/docId/458},
year = {2021}
}
@article{faucris.276879208,
abstract = {A common finding of the literature on dishonesty is that groups are more dishonest than individuals. We revisit this finding by replacing the experimenter, implicitly hurt by subjects' dishonesty, with an explicit third-party: a local charity. With the charity we do not find groups to be more dishonest than individuals. Instead, groups can even help moderate the extent of the dishonesty.(c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.},
author = {Castillo, Geoffrey and Choo, Lawrence and Grimm, Veronika},
doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2022.04.014},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization},
note = {CRIS-Team WoS Importer:2022-06-17},
pages = {598-611},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{Are} groups always more dishonest than individuals? {The} case of salient negative externalities},
volume = {198},
year = {2022}
}
@misc{faucris.241059677,
author = {Castillo, Geoffrey and Choo, Lawrence and Grimm, Veronika},
faupublication = {yes},
peerreviewed = {automatic},
title = {{Are} {Social} {Norms} {Universal}?},
year = {2019}
}
@article{faucris.267490131,
abstract = {While single-level Nash equilibrium problems are quite well understood nowadays, less is known about multi-leader multi-follower games. However, these have important applications, e.g., in the analysis of electricity and gas markets, where often a limited number of firms interacts on various subsequent markets. In this paper, we consider a special class of two-level multi-leader multi-follower games that can be applied, e.g., to model strategic booking decisions in the European entry-exit gas market. For this nontrivial class of games, we develop a solution algorithm that is able to compute the complete set of Nash equilibria instead of just individual solutions or a bigger set of stationary points. Additionally, we prove that for this class of games, the solution set is finite and provide examples for instances without any Nash equilibria in pure strategies. We apply the algorithm to a case study in which we compute strategic booking and nomination decisions in a model of the European entry-exit gas market system. Finally, we use our algorithm to provide a publicly available test library for the considered class of multi-leader multi-follower games. This library contains problem instances with different economic and mathematical properties so that other researchers in the field can test and benchmark newly developed methods for this challenging class of problems.},
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Nowak, Daniel and Schewe, Lars and Schmidt, Martin and Schwartz, Alexandra and Zöttl, Gregor},
doi = {10.1007/s10107-021-01708-0},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {Mathematical Programming},
keywords = {Game theory; Multi-leader multi-follower game; Nash–Cournot equilibria; Peak-load pricing},
note = {CRIS-Team Scopus Importer:2021-12-24},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{A} tractable multi-leader multi-follower peak-load-pricing model with strategic interaction},
year = {2021}
}
@incollection{faucris.119690604,
address = {Rothak},
author = {Grimm, Veronika},
booktitle = {The Current State of Economic Science},
editor = {S. B. Dahiya},
faupublication = {no},
note = {WiSo-Import:2015-04-20:1124},
peerreviewed = {unknown},
publisher = {Spellbound Publications},
title = {{Auction} theory: a survey},
year = {1999}
}
@incollection{faucris.123765004,
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Schmidt, Ulrich and Weber, Martin},
booktitle = {Forschung für die Praxis},
faupublication = {no},
keywords = {Auktionstheorie Bankbetriebslehre; Auktion},
note = {WiSo-Import:2015-03-26:1115},
peerreviewed = {unknown},
publisher = {University of Mannheim},
title = {{Auktionen}: zu viel oder zu wenig geboten?},
volume = {Behavioral Finance Group},
year = {2003}
}
@misc{faucris.122055604,
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Rupp, Björn},
faupublication = {no},
note = {WiSo-Import:2015-08-12:4989},
title = {{Automated} {Bandtwidth} {Exchange}},
year = {2002}
}
@misc{faucris.119617784,
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Engelmann, Dirk},
faupublication = {no},
note = {WiSo-Import:2015-08-12:4987},
title = {{Bidding} {Behavior} in {Multi}-{Unit} {Auctions} - {An} {Experimental} {Investigation} and some {Theoretical} {Insights}},
year = {2003}
}
@article{faucris.114260564,
abstract = {We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with flat demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. We also test revenue equivalence for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units.},
author = {Engelmann, Dirk and Grimm, Veronika},
doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02249.x},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {The Economic Journal},
keywords = {Transformation},
note = {WiSo-Import:2015-03-26:1080},
pages = {855-882},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{Bidding} {Behaviour} in {Multi}-{Unit} {Auctions} – {An} {Experimental} {Investigation}},
url = {http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02249.x/full},
volume = {119},
year = {2009}
}
@article{faucris.117768684,
author = {Grimm, Veronika},
doi = {10.1007/s00712-006-0249-8},
faupublication = {no},
journal = {Journal of Economics},
note = {WiSo-Import:2015-03-26:1127},
pages = {205-208},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{Book} {Review}: {An} {Introduction} to the {Structural} {Econometrics} of {Auction} {Data} (by {H}. {Paarsch} and {H}. {Hong})},
url = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/4036866516m86337/},
volume = {92},
year = {2007}
}
@misc{faucris.233060867,
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Woessmann, Ludger and Gathmann, Christina and Gersbach, Hans},
faupublication = {yes},
peerreviewed = {automatic},
title = {{Brief} des {Wissenschaftlichen} {Beirats} beim {BMWi} zur {Bildungsgerechtigkeit} als {Kernelement} der {Sozialen} {Marktwirtschaft}},
url = {https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/Wissenschaftlicher-Beirat/brief-wissenschaftlicher-beirat-bildungsgerechtigkeit.pdf?{\_}{\_}blob=publicationFile&v=10},
year = {2019}
}
@misc{faucris.233060359,
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Schmidt, Klaus and Bierbrauer, Felix and Gersbach, Hans},
faupublication = {yes},
peerreviewed = {automatic},
title = {{Brief} des {Wissenschaftlichen} {Beirats} beim {BMWi} zur {Nationalen} {Industriestrategie}},
url = {https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/Wissenschaftlicher-Beirat/brief-nationale-industriestrategie.pdf?{\_}{\_}blob=publicationFile&v=2},
year = {2019}
}
@article{faucris.114106564,
abstract = {We experimentally investigate the effect of population viscosity (an increased probability to interact with others of one's type or group) on cooperation in a standard prisoner's dilemma environment. Subjects can repeatedly choose between two groups that differ in the defector gain in the associated prisoner's dilemma. Choosing into the group with the smaller defector-gain can signal one's willingness to cooperate. We find that viscosity produces an endogenous sorting of cooperators and defectors and persistently high rates of cooperation. Higher viscosity leads to a sharp increase in overall cooperation rates and in addition positively affects the subjects' preferences for cooperation.},
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Mengel, Friederike},
doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2008.05.005},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
keywords = {Experiments; Cooperation; Group selection; Norms; Population viscosity},
note = {WiSo-Import:2015-03-25:301},
pages = {202–220},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{Cooperation} in viscous populations - experimental evidence},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0899825608001176},
volume = {66},
year = {2009}
}
@misc{faucris.270756849,
author = {Grimm, Veronika},
faupublication = {yes},
peerreviewed = {automatic},
title = {{Corona}-{Krise} gemeinsam bewältigen, {Resilienz} und {Wachstum} stärken. {Jahresgutachten} 2020/21.},
url = {https://www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de/jahresgutachten-2020.html#einzelkapitel},
year = {2020}
}
@misc{faucris.118443644,
author = {Grimm, Veronika},
faupublication = {yes},
note = {WiSo-Import:2015-08-12:4983},
title = {{Cournot} {Competition} under {Uncertainty}},
year = {2008}
}
@article{faucris.284910757,
author = {Abraham, Martin and Collischon, Matthias and Grimm, Veronika and Kreuter, Frauke and Moser, Klaus and Niessen, Cornelia and Schnabel, Claus and Stephan, Gesine and Trappmann, Mark and Wolbring, Tobias},
doi = {10.1186/s12651-022-00325-4},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {Journal for Labour Market Research},
keywords = {Chancengleichheit},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{COVID}-19, normative attitudes and pluralistic ignorance in employer-employee relationships},
volume = {56},
year = {2022}
}
@article{faucris.279392363,
abstract = {Das kostenbasierte Engpassmanagement in Deutschland hat ein Ablaufdatum, da die Strombinnenmarkt-VO eine marktbasierte Beschaffung für alle EU-Staaten vorsieht. Das Smart Market Konzept könnte als marktbasiertes Element kurzfristig die EU-Vorgaben erfüllen und zu einem kosteneffizienten Engpassmanagement beitragen. Es bindet verstärkt Flexibilitätsoptionen in die Engpassbewirtschaftung ein, verbessert die Integration erneuerbarer Erzeugung und liefert regional differenzierte Investitionsanreize. Im Rahmen des Projekts „EOM-Plus“ werden der Smart Market-Ansatz und die Auswirkungen einer deutschlandweiten Umsetzung analysiert.
},
author = {Egerer, Jonas and Grimm, Veronika and Hilpert, Johannes and Holzhammer, Uwe and Hümmer, Benedikt and Lang, Lukas and Mast, Tanja and Nysten, Jana and Pfefferer, Ulrike},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen : et ; Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft, Recht, Technik und Umwelt},
pages = {53 - 56},
peerreviewed = {No},
title = {{Das} {Smart} {Market}-{Konzept} als marktbasiertes {Element} im deutschen {Engpassmanagement}},
volume = {72},
year = {2022}
}
@misc{faucris.215657840,
abstract = {In this data documentation, we provide detailed information on the data that is used in order to calibrate the GATE model. Since we are looking at the hypothetical German electricity market in 2035 and the resulting investment incentives, we have to select all exogenous parameters based on future forecasts for this period. We consider the German market area since excellent data are available from the political processes that accompany the network expansion planning procedure. In order to ensure a high degree of consistency of the exogenous parameters - and in order to allow comparisons with other forecasts for that market area - we predominantly use input parameters from the Network Development Plan Electricity (NDP) which is the official basis for network expansion planning in Germany. Hereby, we mainly rely on the NDP 2025, where network expansion required until 2025 is determined, in its 2015 version.
Deutschland und Europa stehen mitten in einem gewaltigen Umbau, um als Region einen entscheidenden Beitrag zum Schutz des Klimas und vor den globalen Folgen des Klimawandels zu leisten. Die extremen Wetterereignisse global und bei uns in Deutschland haben die Dringlichkeit für entschiedenes Handeln noch einmal deutlich gemacht. Der Klimawandel macht es notwendig, die gesamte Wirtschaft bis spätestens 2045 auf das Ziel der Klimaneutralität auszurichten. Das erfordert Neudenken und Veränderungen in allen Sektoren und Branchen. Befördert von der Dynamik der Digitalisierung und begleitet von den politischen Zielsetzungen müssen Klimaverträglichkeit, Wachstum, Beschäftigung und Ertragskraft der Unternehmen neu in Einklang gebracht werden. Wie können wir als Gesellschaft dauerhaften und fair geteilten Wohlstand schaffen, ohne das globale Klima weiter zu belasten? Wie können wir die Chancen der Digitalisierung nutzen und wie kann daraus ein digital-ökologisches Programm für die nächsten Dekaden werden?
Dieses Buch stellt die Ziele, Schritte und den Stand des Umbaus der wichtigsten Wirtschaftsbereiche dar. Es gibt einen Überblick über den Umbau, präsentiert Beispiele und nennt erstmals die konkreten Anforderungen für die entscheidenden Branchen. Es soll als Aktionsplan für Politik und Gesellschaft dienen, indem es zeigt, welche politischen Voraussetzungen in 2022, 2025 und 2030 geschaffen sein müssen, um dem Klimawandel und seinen Auswirkungen wirksam zu begegnen und die deutschen Klimaziele für 2045 zu erreiche},
address = {Berlin},
editor = {Grimm, Veronika and Lang, Joachim and Messner, Dirk and Meyer, Dirk and Meyer, Lutz and Nikutta, Sigrid and Schaible, Stefan},
faupublication = {yes},
isbn = {978-3430210690},
peerreviewed = {automatic},
publisher = {Econ},
title = {{Deutschlands} {Neue} {Agenda}: {Die} {Transformation} von {Wirtschaft} und {Staat} in eine klimaneutrale und digitale {Gesellschaft}},
url = {https://deutschlands-neue-agenda.de/de/},
year = {2021}
}
@misc{faucris.120809524,
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Zöttl, Gregor and Ambrosius, Mirjam and Rückel, Bastian and Sölch, Christian},
faupublication = {yes},
peerreviewed = {automatic},
title = {{Dezentralität} und zellulare {Optimierung} - {Auswirkungen} auf den {Netzausbaubedarf}. ({Gutachten} im {Auftrag} der {N}-{Ergie} {AG}, gemeinsam mit der {Prognos} {AG})},
url = {https://www.fau.de/files/2016/10/Energiestudie{\_}Studie.pdf},
year = {2016}
}
@misc{faucris.241018345,
author = {Abele-Brehm, Andrea and Dreier, Horst and Fuest, Clemens and Grimm, Veronika and Kräusslich, Hans-Georg and Krause, Gérard and Leonhard, Matthias and Lohse, Ansgar W. and Lohse, Martin J. and Mansky, Thomas and Peichl, Andreas and Schmid, Roland M. and Wess, Günther and Woopen, Christiane},
faupublication = {yes},
peerreviewed = {automatic},
title = {{Die} {Bekämpfung} der {Corona}-{Pandemie} tragfähig gestalten. {Empfehlungen} für eine flexible, riskoadaptierte {Strategie}.},
url = {https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/Coronavirus-Pandemie-Strategie-Fuest-Lohse-etal-2020-04.pdf},
year = {2020}
}
@misc{faucris.318106122,
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Groß, Christian},
faupublication = {yes},
peerreviewed = {automatic},
title = {{Die} {Energiepreispauschale}: {Wie} zielsicher sie war und welche {Schlüsse} wir daraus ziehen können},
url = {https://www.svr-verbraucherfragen.de/publication/SVRV{\_}Policy-Brief{\_}Energiepreispauschale.pdf},
year = {2023}
}
@article{faucris.289382936,
abstract = {Sanctions and their effectiveness are at the centre of the discussion about an appropriate response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. At the latest since the atrocities of the war became evident and payment for gas supplies in roubles was brought into play, voices calling for a natural gas embargo have been growing. In the discussion about the possible consequences of such an embargo, forecasts vary from serious but manageable effects on economic development to mass unemployment and deindustrialisation. Regarding the short run, the main question is: How much of Russian natural gas supply can be replaced and saved by next winter. We provide an overview of existing analyses on savings and substitution potentials, followed by some fundamental policy principles aimed at dealing with a halt in Russian natural gas supplies.
2high death toll. Protection of vulnerable groups without further measures requires unrealistically strict isolation. A key insight is that high compliance is critical for the effectiveness of a “trace & isolate” approach. Our model allows to analyze the interplay of group-specific social distancing and tracing also beyond our case study in scenarios with a large number of groups reflecting, e.g., sectoral, regional, or age differentiation and group-specific take-up rates for tracing apps.
natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior
of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke–Groves mechanism,
characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the weighted sum of expected
social surplus and expected tax revenue, and show that these mechanisms avoid
budget deficits and prevent excessive entry.},
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Riedel, Frank and Wolfstetter, Elmar},
doi = {10.1007/s100580300087},
faupublication = {no},
journal = {Review of Economic Design},
keywords = {Mechanism design;auctions;entry;regulation;optimal taxation},
note = {WiSo-Import:2015-03-26:1120},
pages = {443-463},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{Implementing} efficient market structure},
url = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/nvft5w3wv6ydqvvk/},
volume = {7},
year = {2003}
}
@article{faucris.123468664,
abstract = {In this study, we investigate how and why people discriminate among different groups, including their in-group and multiple out-groups. In a laboratory experiment, we use dictator games for five groups to compare actual transfers to in-group and out-group agents with the respective beliefs held by dictators and recipients in these groups. We observe both in-group favoritism and discrimination across multiple out-groups. Individuals expect others to be in-group biased, as well as to be treated differently by different out-groups. We find that dictators’ in-group favoritism is positively related to the degree of in-group favoritism they expect other dictators to exhibit. Moreover, we find that a dictator tends to be relatively more generous toward a specific out-group when he or she expects that dictators belonging to that out-group are generous toward members of his or her in-group. Thus, our study provides evidence for indirect reciprocation expectatio},
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Utikal, Verena and Valmasoni, Lorenzo},
doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2017.08.015},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization},
pages = {254-271},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{In}-group favoritism and discrimination among multiple out-groups},
year = {2017}
}
@misc{faucris.306037862,
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Schloegl, Robert},
faupublication = {yes},
peerreviewed = {automatic},
title = {{In} {Krisenzeiten} wie diesen hat {Politikberatung} durchaus {Einfluss}},
url = {https://newsletter.leopoldina.org/mag/0410368001685538537/p4},
year = {2023}
}
@article{faucris.252988061,
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Nöh, Lukas and Schwarz, Milena},
doi = {10.1007/s10273-021-2867-8},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {Wirtschaftsdienst},
note = {CRIS-Team Scopus Importer:2021-03-26},
pages = {162-167},
peerreviewed = {No},
title = {{Investitionen} für nachhaltiges {Wachstum} in {Deutschland}: {Status} quo und {Perspektiven}},
volume = {101},
year = {2021}
}
@incollection{faucris.123264064,
address = {Frankfurt am Main},
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Zöttl, Gregor},
booktitle = {Welche Industrie wollen wir? Nachhaltig produzieren - zukunftsorientiert wachsen},
editor = {Wolfgang Lemb},
faupublication = {yes},
isbn = {978-3-593-50473-5},
keywords = {Strommarkt; Industrieökonomie},
peerreviewed = {unknown},
publisher = {Campus},
title = {{Investitionsanreize} im {Strommarkt} der {Zukunft}},
year = {2015}
}
@misc{faucris.318124385,
author = {Kühling, Jürgen and Haucap, Justus and Amin, Munib and Brunekreeft, Gert and Fouquet, Dörte and Grimm, Veronika and Gundel, Jörg and Ketter, Wolfgang and Kment, Martin and Kreusel, Jochen and Kreuter-Kirchhof, Charlotte and Liebensteiner, Mario and Moser, Albert and Ott, Marion and Rehtanz, Christian and Wetzel, Heike},
doi = {10.48669/esys{\_}2023-4},
faupublication = {yes},
peerreviewed = {automatic},
title = {"{Investitionsanreize} setzen, {Reservekapazitäten} sichern: {Optionen} zur {Marktintegration} erneuerbarer {Energien}" - {Stellungnahme} des {Akademienprojekts} "{Energiesysteme} der {Zukunft}"},
year = {2023}
}
@incollection{faucris.121912824,
address = {Tübingen},
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Zöttl, Gregor},
booktitle = {Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Seminar Ottobeuren},
editor = {Wolfgang Franz, Werner Güth, Hans J. Ramser, Manfred Stadler},
faupublication = {yes},
keywords = {Forschungsbericht 2010},
note = {WiSo-Import:2015-04-20:1079},
pages = {51-69},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
publisher = {Mohr Siebeck},
title = {{Investment} decisions in liberalized electricity markets: the impact of market design},
volume = {40 (Marktmacht)},
year = {2010}
}
@article{faucris.114283004,
abstract = {In this paper we analyze investment decisions of strategic firms that anticipate competition on
many consecutive spot markets with fluctuating (and possibly uncertain) demand.We study how
the degree of spot market competition affects investment incentives and welfare and provide an
application of the model to electricity market data. We show that more competitive spot market
prices strictly decrease investment incentives of strategic firms. The effect can be severe enough
to even offset the beneficial impact of more competitive spot markets on social welfare. Our
results obtain with and without free entry. The analysis demonstrates that investment incentives
necessarily have to be taken into account for a serious assessment of electricity spot market design.},
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Zöttl, Gregor},
doi = {10.1111/jems.12029},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {Journal of Economics & Management Strategy},
note = {WiSo-Import:2015-03-26:1128},
pages = {832-851},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{Investment} {Incentives} and {Electricity} {Spot} {Market} {Competition}},
volume = {22},
year = {2013}
}
@article{faucris.121038104,
abstract = {This paper analyzes investment incentives for flexible manufacturing facilities under different market designs. We propose a multi-stage equilibrium model incorporating endogenous determination of generation capacity investment, network expansion and redispatch based on the model introduced by Grimm et al. (2016), including flexibilization of industrial electricity consumption. The model allows to investigate incentives for flexibilization and the impact of flexible industrial electricity consumers on the system. An application to the German electricity market reveals that flexible industrial electricity consumption can be profitable for firms. If the share of flexible electricity consumers is high, price fluctuations are mitigated, which lowers the individual cost savings from demand flexibility. Comparing different market designs, positive impacts of flexible electricity demand on the system are observed in both the system optimum and the market equilibrium. In scenarios with flexible industrial electricity consumption, welfare is considerably higher than in those without. This is due to lower electricity costs of industrial consumers, but more importantly due to less investment in conventional power generation as well as a reduced transmission network expansion. However, a comparison of nodal and uniform pricing underlines the importance of regional price signals with respect to an efficient allocation of flexible industrial demand.
},
author = {Egerer, Jonas and Grimm, Veronika and Niazmand, Kiana and Runge, Philipp},
doi = {10.1016/j.apenergy.2023.120662},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {Applied Energy},
keywords = {Green ammonia; Ammonia trade; Optimization model; Case study Australia to Germany},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{The} economics of global green ammonia trade – “{Shipping} {Australian} wind and sunshine to {Germany}”},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306261923000260},
volume = {334},
year = {2023}
}
@misc{faucris.318114434,
author = {Richel, Aurore and Vladikova, Daria and Peneva, Teodora Margaritova and Duic, Neven and Kalogirou, Soteris and Papanicolas, Costas N. and Hamburg, Arvi and Laaksonen, Petteri and Corbeau, Anne-Sophie and Grimm, Veronika and Kohse-Höinghaus, Katharina and Maniatis, Yannis and Imre, Attila R. and Masi, Maurizio and Mulder, Machiel and Neumann, Anne and Thunman, Henrik and Gebart, Rikard and Brandon, Nigel and Thomas, Hywel Rhys and Gillett, William},
faupublication = {yes},
peerreviewed = {automatic},
title = {{The} {Future} of {Gas}},
url = {https://easac.eu/fileadmin/user{\_}upload/EASAC{\_}Future{\_}of{\_}Gas{\_}Web.pdf},
year = {2023}
}
@article{faucris.123797344,
abstract = {In this paper we propose an equilibrium model in order to analyze the impact of electricity market design on generation and transmission expansion in liberalized electricity markets. In a multi-level structure, our framework takes into account that generation investment and operation is decided by private investors, while network expansion and redispatch is decided by a regulated transmission system operator - as well as the different objectives of firms (profit maximization) and the regulator (welfare maximization). In order to illustrate the possibilities to quantify long term economic effects with our framework, we calibrate our model for the German electricity market. We consider various moderate adjustments of the market design: (i) the division of the market area into two price zones, (ii) the efficient curtailment of renewable production and (iii) a cost-benefit-driven balance between network expansion and network management measures. We then analyze the impact of these market designs on generation and transmission investment in case those design elements are anticipated upon network development planning. The resulting investment and production decisions are compared to a benchmark that reflects the current German electricity market design and to an overall optimal first-best benchmark. Our results reveal that price zones do have a significant impact on locational choice of generators and result in a reduced need for network expansion, but lead to only moderate annual welfare gains of approximately 0.9% of annual total system costs. Anticipation of optimal curtailment of renewables and a cost-benefit-driven use of redispatch operations upon network expansion planning, however, implies a welfare gain of over 4.9% of annual total system costs per year as compared to the existing market design, which equals 85% of the maximal possible welfare gain of the first-best benchmar},
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Rückel, Bastian and Sölch, Christian and Zöttl, Gregor},
doi = {10.1016/j.eneco.2020.104934},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {Energy Economics},
keywords = {Electricity Markets; Network Expansion; Generation Expansion; Investment Incentives; Congestion Management; Computational Equilibrium Models},
month = {Jan},
note = {CRIS-Team Scopus Importer:2020-12-25},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{The} {Impact} of {Market} {Design} on {Transmission} and {Generation} {Investment} in {Electricity} {Markets}},
volume = {93},
year = {2021}
}
@article{faucris.230365222,
abstract = {Many long-term investment planning models for liberalized electricity
markets either optimize for the entire electricity system or focus on
confined jurisdictions, abstracting from adjacent markets. In this
paper, we provide models for analyzing the impact of the
interdependencies between a core electricity market and its neighboring
markets on key long-run decisions. This we do both for zonal and nodal
pricing schemes. The identification of welfare optimal investments in
transmission lines and renewable capacity within a core electricity
market requires a spatially restricted objective function, which also
accounts for benefits from cross-border electricity trading. This leads
to mixed-integer nonlinear multilevel optimization problems with
bilinear nonconvexities for which we adapt a Benders-like decomposition
approach from the literature. In a case study, we use a stylized
six-node network to disentangle different effects of optimal regional
(as compared to supra-regional) investment planning. Regional planning
alters investment in transmission and renewable capacity in the core
region, which affects private investment in generation capacity also in
adjacent regions and increases welfare in the core region at the cost of
system welfare. Depending on the congestion-pricing scheme, the
regulator of the core region follows different strategies to increase
welfare causing distributional effects among stakeholder},
author = {Egerer, Jonas and Grimm, Veronika and Kleinert, Thomas and Schmidt, Martin and Zöttl, Gregor},
doi = {10.1016/j.ejor.2020.10.055},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {European Journal of Operational Research},
keywords = {Neighboring Markets, Renewables, Network Expansion, Multilevel Optimization, Benders Decomposition},
pages = {696 - 713},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{The} {Impact} of {Neighboring} {Markets} on {Renewable} {Locations}, {Transmission} {Expansion}, and {Generation} {Investment}},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0377221720309486},
volume = {292},
year = {2021}
}
@article{faucris.317552874,
abstract = {In many industries, low-carbon hydrogen will substitute fossil fuels in the course of the transformation to climate neutrality. This paper contributes to understanding this transformation. This paper provides an overview of energy- and emission-intensive industry sectors with great potential to defossilize their production processes with hydrogen. An assessment of future hydrogen demand for various defossilization strategies in Germany that rely on hydrogen as a feedstock or as an energy carrier to a different extent in the sectors steel, chemicals, cement, lime, glass, as well as pulp and paper is carried out. Results indicate that aggregate industrial hydrogen demand in those industries would range between 197 TWh and 298 TWh if production did not relocate abroad for any industry sector. The range for hydrogen demand is mainly due to differences in the extent of hydrogen utilization as compared to alternative transformation paths for example based on electrification. The attractiveness of production abroad is then assessed based on the prospective comparative cost advantage of relocating parts of the value chain to excellent production sites for low-carbon hydrogen. Case studies are provided for the steel industry, as well as the chemical industry with ethylene production through methanol and the production of urea on the basis of ammonia. The energy cost of the respective value chains in Germany is then compared to the case of value chains partly located in regions with excellent conditions for renewable energies and hydrogen production. The results illustrate, that at least for some processes – as ammonia production – relocation to those favorable regions may occur due to substantial comparative cost advantages.},
author = {Egerer, Jonas and Farhang-Damghani, Nima and Grimm, Veronika and Runge, Philipp},
doi = {10.1016/j.apenergy.2023.122485},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {Applied Energy},
keywords = {Ammonia and urea; Hydrogen-based processes; Industrial hydrogen demand scenarios; Iron and steel; Methanol and ethylene; Transformation of German industry; Value chains},
note = {CRIS-Team Scopus Importer:2024-02-02},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{The} industry transformation from fossil fuels to hydrogen will reorganize value chains: {Big} picture and case studies for {Germany}},
volume = {358},
year = {2024}
}
@article{faucris.292866427,
abstract = {In many industries, low-carbon hydrogen will substitute fossil fuels in the course of the transformation to climate neutrality. This paper contributes to understanding this transformation. This paper provides an overview of energy- and emission-intensive industry sectors with great potential to defossilize their production processes with hydrogen. An assessment of future hydrogen demand for various defossilization strategies in Germany that rely on hydrogen as a feedstock or as an energy carrier to a different extent in the sectors steel, chemicals, cement, lime, glass, as well as pulp and paper is carried out. Results indicate that aggregate industrial hydrogen demand in those industries would range between 197 TWh and 298 TWh if production did not relocate abroad for any industry sector. The range for hydrogen demand is mainly due to differences in the extent of hydrogen utilization as compared to alternative transformation paths for example based on electrification. The attractiveness of production abroad is then assessed based on the prospective comparative cost advantage of relocating parts of the value chain to excellent production sites for low-carbon hydrogen. Case studies are provided for the steel industry, as well as the chemical industry with ethylene production through methanol and the production of urea on the basis of ammonia. The energy cost of the respective value chains in Germany is then compared to the case of value chains partly located in regions with excellent conditions for renewable energies and hydrogen production. The results illustrate, that at least for some processes – as ammonia production – relocation to those favorable regions may occur due to substantial comparative cost advantages.},
author = {Egerer, Jonas and Farhang-Damghani, Nima and Grimm, Veronika and Runge, Philipp},
doi = {10.1016/j.apenergy.2023.122485},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {Applied Energy},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{The} industry transformation from fossil fuels to hydrogen will reorganize value chains: {Big} picture and case studies for {Germany}},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306261923018494},
volume = {358},
year = {2024}
}
@misc{faucris.306034724,
author = {Bauer, Franz and Bollerhey, Timo and Egerer, Jonas and Erdmann, Martin Christopher and Exenberger, Markus and Geyer, Florian and Grimm, Veronika and Hofrichter, Andreas and Krieger, Malte and Runge, Philipp and Sterner, Michael and Wirth, Johannes and Wragge, Daniel},
faupublication = {yes},
peerreviewed = {automatic},
title = {{The} {Market} {Ramp}-{Up} of {Renewable} {Hydrogen} and its {Derivatives} - the {Role} of {H2Global}},
url = {https://www.wirtschaftstheorie.rw.fau.de/files/2023/06/The-Market-Ramp-Up-of-Renewable-Hydrogen-and-its-Derivatives-the-Role-of-H2Global.pdf},
year = {2023}
}
@article{faucris.215761542,
abstract = {Although
reputation has been shown to solve problems of information and opportunism in
business relationships, knowledge about the emergence of reputation in business
relationships beyond the internet is considerably scarcer. In this paper, we
argue that a norm of reciprocity is a major driver for information transfer in
social and economic systems. A social norm to return the favors that are given
by others will enhance the flow of information about potential exchange
partners. We distinguish between direct and generalized reciprocity and argue
that both may foster the flow of information about exchange partners in
economic systems. Moreover, we examine the interdependency between competition
and reciprocity. Our empirical evidence is based on a laboratory experiment
with students and a field experiment with 240 managers of a German business
cluster. Our results show that direct reciprocity, in particular, is a major
driver for the transmission of reputational information to third parties.
Moreover, transmission costs and competition reduce the willingness to produce
information in an exchange syste},
author = {Abraham, Martin and Damelang, Andreas and Grimm, Veronika and Neeß, Christina and Seebauer, Michael},
doi = {10.1093/esr/jcaa038},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {European Sociological Review},
pages = {137-154},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{The} role of reciprocity in the creation of reputation},
volume = {37},
year = {2021}
}
@book{faucris.122547524,
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Riedel, Frank and Wolfstetter, Elmar},
faupublication = {yes},
peerreviewed = {No},
title = {{The} {Third} {Generation} ({UMTS}) {Spectrum} {Auction} in {Germany}},
year = {2004}
}
@incollection{faucris.121913704,
abstract = {The second–generation (GSM) spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid multi-unit auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a game theoretic explanation of low price equilibrium in simultaneous, ascending-bid multi-unit auctions. In particular, it is shown that in the unique equilibrium that survives iterated elimination of dominated strategies, the efficient allocation is reached at minimum bids.},
address = {Cambridge, MA},
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Riedel, Frank and Wolfstetter, Elmar},
booktitle = {Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunication},
editor = {G. Illing},
faupublication = {no},
isbn = {0-262-09037-6},
keywords = {auctions;telecommunications;industrial organization;game theory},
note = {WiSo-Import:2015-04-20:1118},
pages = {223-246},
peerreviewed = {unknown},
publisher = {MIT Press},
title = {{The} third generation ({UMTS}) spectrum license auction in {Germany}},
url = {http://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=WHrpLC67FgMC&oi=fnd&pg=PA223&dq=%22Spectrum+Auctions+and+Competition+in+Telecommunications%22+&ots=lET01rF9dh&sig=m0S25NvIxFkeCbyCVrj{\_}O2pBJeE#v=onepage&q&f=false},
year = {2004}
}
@book{faucris.122514304,
address = {Aachen},
author = {Grimm, Veronika},
faupublication = {no},
isbn = {978-3832211387},
note = {WiSo-Import:2015-04-20:1126},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
publisher = {Shaker Verlag},
title = {{Three} {Essays} on {Mechanism} {Design} and {Multi}-{Object} {Auctions}},
url = {http://www.amazon.de/Mechanism-Multi-Object-Auctions-Berichte-Volkswirtschaft/dp/3832211381},
year = {2003}
}
@misc{faucris.289436845,
abstract = {This paper extends the literature studying the effect of social media content on the evaluation of job candidates. In a large-scale online experiment that resembles real-life screening of candidates for a job in the hospitality sector, we find that information available on social media through hashtags and liked pages can have a crucial effect on a candidate's chances of obtaining a good rating. Candidates with social media content indicating mental health problems receive lower ratings by an amount equivalent to the effect of having three years on-the-job experience. Interestingly, candidates with no social media profile receive even lower ratings than candidates with mental health problems. In addition, unappealing social media content leads to the strongest reduction in ratings, equivalent to the value of nine years of on-the-job experience. These results demonstrate social media's substantial and likely increasing role in the hiring process.
Deutschland und Europa stehen mitten in einem gewaltigen Umbau, um als Region einen entscheidenden Beitrag zum Schutz des Klimas und vor den globalen Folgen des Klimawandels zu leisten. Die extremen Wetterereignisse global und bei uns in Deutschland haben die Dringlichkeit für entschiedenes Handeln noch einmal deutlich gemacht. Der Klimawandel macht es notwendig, die gesamte Wirtschaft bis spätestens 2045 auf das Ziel der Klimaneutralität auszurichten. Das erfordert Neudenken und Veränderungen in allen Sektoren und Branchen. Befördert von der Dynamik der Digitalisierung und begleitet von den politischen Zielsetzungen müssen Klimaverträglichkeit, Wachstum, Beschäftigung und Ertragskraft der Unternehmen neu in Einklang gebracht werden. Wie können wir als Gesellschaft dauerhaften und fair geteilten Wohlstand schaffen, ohne das globale Klima weiter zu belasten? Wie können wir die Chancen der Digitalisierung nutzen und wie kann daraus ein digital-ökologisches Programm für die nächsten Dekaden werden?
Dieses Buch stellt die Ziele, Schritte und den Stand des Umbaus der wichtigsten Wirtschaftsbereiche dar. Es gibt einen Überblick über den Umbau, präsentiert Beispiele und nennt erstmals die konkreten Anforderungen für die entscheidenden Branchen. Es soll als Aktionsplan für Politik und Gesellschaft dienen, indem es zeigt, welche politischen Voraussetzungen in 2022, 2025 und 2030 geschaffen sein müssen, um dem Klimawandel und seinen Auswirkungen wirksam zu begegnen und die deutschen Klimaziele für 2045 zu erreiche},
address = {Berlin},
author = {Grimm, Veronika},
booktitle = {Deutschlands Neue Agenda: Die Transformation von Wirtschaft und Staat in eine klimaneutrale und digitale Gesellschaft | Klimawandel und Digitalisierung werden uns verändern},
editor = {Grimm, V., Lang, J., Messner, D, Meyer, D., Meyer, L., Nikutta, S. Schaible, S.},
faupublication = {yes},
isbn = {978-3430210690},
peerreviewed = {unknown},
title = {{Wasserstoff} als {Chance} für {Resilienz} und {Wachstum} in {Europa}},
url = {https://deutschlands-neue-agenda.de/de/beitrag/wasserstoff-als-chance-fuer-resilienz-und-wachstum-in-europa/},
year = {2021}
}
@article{faucris.306039069,
abstract = {Klimaneutralität in Europa gegen Mitte des Jahrhunderts erfordert die
Ablösung fossiler Energieträger durch die direkte oder indirekte Nutzung
regenerativ erzeugten Stroms in den Sektoren Wärme und Mobilität sowie
der Industrie. Die direkte Elektrifizierung und der indirekte Weg über
Wasserstoff sind dabei komplementär. Die Elektrifizierung muss in allen
Sektoren ambitioniert vorangetrieben werden. In einem integrierten
Energiesystem wird die indirekte Sektorenkopplung über Wasserstoff und
wasserstoffbasierte Energieträger die Elektrifizierung optimal ergänz},
author = {Grimm, Veronika},
doi = {10.2478/wd-2023-0049},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {Wirtschaftsdienst},
peerreviewed = {No},
title = {{Wasserstoff} – {Handlungsbedarf} und {Chancen} im {Zuge} der {Energiekrise}},
url = {https://www.wirtschaftsdienst.eu/inhalt/jahr/2023/heft/3/beitrag/wasserstoff-handlungsbedarf-und-chancen-im-zuge-der-energiekrise-7343.html},
year = {2023}
}
@article{faucris.224987441,
abstract = {In this paper we examine diffusion of responsibility in a whistleblowing experiment. We use a multi-player asymmetric information ultimatum game where only the proposer and a subset of the responders (the information insiders) know the size of a pot that the proposer distributes among information insiders and outsiders. Insiders have a clear monetary incentive to whistleblow in case of a small pot in order to avoid rejection of seemingly unfair offers by outsiders; in case of a large pot only altruistic motives could explain that insiders whistleblow. We vary the number of information insiders, one or two, who can whistleblow. We find that in all treatments close to 60% of the insiders whistleblow when they are pivotal for both small and large pots. In a treatment where other insider can also blow the whistle, we observe a significant drop in case only altruistic motives can explain whistleblowing. We show that the effect is due to the extensive margin, i.e. the share of whistleblowers drops to 20%, while patterns of active whistleblowers do not change. In case of low pot sizes, where whistleblowing is in line with selfish motives, we do not observe diffusion of responsibility, in spite of a possible free riding incentive due to a positive cost of whistleblowing.},
author = {Choo, Lawrence and Grimm, Veronika and Horváth, Gergely and Nitta, K.},
doi = {10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.07.010},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {European Economic Review},
keywords = {Diffusion of responsibility; Pro-social behaviours; Whistleblowing},
note = {CRIS-Team Scopus Importer:2019-08-23},
pages = {287-301},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{Whistleblowing} and diffusion of responsibility: {An} experiment},
volume = {119},
year = {2019}
}
@article{faucris.267485712,
author = {Feld, Lars P. and Grimm, Veronika and Reuter, Wolf Heinrich},
doi = {10.1007/s10273-021-2935-0},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {Wirtschaftsdienst},
note = {CRIS-Team Scopus Importer:2021-12-24},
pages = {418-424},
peerreviewed = {No},
title = {{Zukunftsperspektiven} sichern durch {Reformen}, nicht durch {Schulden}},
volume = {101},
year = {2021}
}
@article{faucris.121531784,
abstract = {In der energiepolitischen Debatte werden derzeit Maßnahmen zur Reduktion des notwendigen
übertragungsnetz-Ausbaus diskutiert. Dieser Beitrag analysiert das Potential zweier Maßnahmen, die mit
verhältnismässig geringfügigen Anpassungen des Ordnungsrahmens realisierbar sind: Eine Berücksichtigung
von Möglichkeiten des Redispatch schon bei der Netzentwicklungsplanung und effizientes
Einspeisemanagement. Modellrechnungen zeigen, dass beide Maßnahmen geeignet sind, den Netzausbau zu
reduzieren und eine Kombination beider Maßnahmen sogar einen substanziellen Teil des Netzausbaus
verzichtbar machen kann. Wir zeigen darüber hinaus, dass beide Maßnahmen das Potential haben, moderate
Wohlfahrtsgewinne zu ermöglichen, die sich mittelfristig in niedrigeren Stromkosten wiederspiegeln. Die
Kombination beider Maßnahmen generiert im Modell 83% des Wohlfahrtsgewinns in einem First-Best
Benchmark, in dem alle Investitions- und Produktionsentscheidungen optimal getroffen werde},
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Rückel, Bastian and Sölch, Christian and Zöttl, Gregor},
doi = {10.1007/s41025-016-0027-5},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik},
pages = {465-498},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{Zur} {Reduktion} des {Netzausbaubedarfs} durch {Redispatch} und effizientes {Engpassmanagement}: {Eine} modellbasierte {Abschätzung}},
volume = {41},
year = {2016}
}