% Encoding: UTF-8
@COMMENT{BibTeX export based on data in FAU CRIS: https://cris.fau.de/}
@COMMENT{For any questions please write to cris-support@fau.de}
@misc{faucris.121259204,
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Zöttl, Gregor},
faupublication = {no},
note = {WiSo-Import:2015-08-12:4985},
title = {{Access} to {Commitment} {Devices} {Reduces} {Investment} {Incentives} in {Oligopoly}},
year = {2005}
}
@article{faucris.114872164,
abstract = {We analyze firms' investment incentives in markets where demand at spot markets is fluctuating and storability of the output is limited. Firms will then find it optimal to invest in a differentiated portfolio of technologies in order to serve fluctuating demand. For optimal behavior of firms, this has been analyzed in the so-called peak load pricing literature—cf. Crew and Kleindorfer [Crew, M., P. Kleindorfer. 1986. The Economics of Public Utility Regulation. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA]. We analyze the case of strategically behaved firms. We derive the equilibrium of the investment game and compare it to the benchmark case of optimal investment. We find that strategic firms have an incentive to overinvest in base load technologies but choose total capacities, which are too low from a welfare point of view.},
author = {Zöttl, Gregor},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {Operations Research},
note = {WiSo-Import:2015-03-26:5041},
pages = {1637-1649},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{A} {Framework} of {Peak} {Load} {Pricing} with {Strategic} {Firms}},
volume = {58},
year = {2010}
}
@article{faucris.284486053,
abstract = {The clique problem with multiple-choice constraints (CPMC), i.e. the problem of finding a k-clique in a k-partite graph with known partition, occurs as a substructure in many real-world applications, in particular scheduling and railway timetabling. Although CPMC is NP-complete in general, it is known to be solvable in polynomial time when the so-called dependency graph of G is a forest. In this article, we focus on the special case CPMCSP, where the dependency graph of G is series–parallel. We give a polynomial-time algorithm for CPMCSP using dynamic programming. Further, we provide some facet-inducing inequalities of the CPMCSP polytope, mainly using properties of the stable set polytope of the complement graph of G. Among these, we give a separation algorithm for the so-called embedded odd-clique-cycle inequalities using dynamic programming. If the number of vertices per subset of the k-partition is bounded, then its runtime is polynomial in the size of the dependency graph.},
author = {Bärmann, Andreas and Gemander, Patrick and Merkert, Maximilian and Wiertz, Ann-Kathrin and Zaragoza Martínez, Francisco Javier},
doi = {10.1016/j.dam.2022.09.015},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {Discrete Applied Mathematics},
keywords = {Clique problem; Dynamic programming; Integer programming; Multiple-choice constraints; Series–parallel graphs},
month = {Jan},
note = {CRIS-Team Scopus Importer:2022-11-04},
pages = {145-166},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{Algorithms} for the clique problem with multiple-choice constraints under a series–parallel dependency graph},
volume = {324},
year = {2023}
}
@article{faucris.204075926,
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Schewe, Lars and Schmidt, Martin and Zöttl, Gregor},
doi = {10.1007/s00186-018-0647-z},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {Mathematical Methods of Operations Research},
pages = {223–255},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{A} multilevel model of the {European} entry-exit gas market},
volume = {89},
year = {2019}
}
@misc{faucris.269388343,
abstract = {We analyze Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems (GNEPs) for which the
objectives of the individuals are interdependent and shared constraints
are governed by a system of partial differential equations (PDEs). This
allows us to model the strategic interaction of competing firms, which
explicitly take into account the dynamics of transporting a commodity,
such as natural gas, through a network. We establish existence of a
variational equilibrium, which solves the considered GNEP. We identify a
reformulation of the original equilibrium problem that is suited to
derive and establish a solution algorithm. Based on the solutions for a
test instance, we finally illustrate how our results can be used to
analyze dynamic aspects such as linepack in the context of liberalized
gas market},
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Hintermüller, Michael and Huber, Oliver and Schewe, Lars and Schmidt, Martin and Zöttl, Gregor},
faupublication = {yes},
peerreviewed = {automatic},
title = {{A} {PDE}-{Constrained} {Generalized} {Nash} {Equilibrium} {Approach} for {Modeling} {Gas} {Markets} with {Transport}},
url = {https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-trr154/frontdoor/index/index/start/14/rows/10/sortfield/score/sortorder/desc/searchtype/simple/query/zöttl/docId/458},
year = {2021}
}
@article{faucris.267490131,
abstract = {While single-level Nash equilibrium problems are quite well understood nowadays, less is known about multi-leader multi-follower games. However, these have important applications, e.g., in the analysis of electricity and gas markets, where often a limited number of firms interacts on various subsequent markets. In this paper, we consider a special class of two-level multi-leader multi-follower games that can be applied, e.g., to model strategic booking decisions in the European entry-exit gas market. For this nontrivial class of games, we develop a solution algorithm that is able to compute the complete set of Nash equilibria instead of just individual solutions or a bigger set of stationary points. Additionally, we prove that for this class of games, the solution set is finite and provide examples for instances without any Nash equilibria in pure strategies. We apply the algorithm to a case study in which we compute strategic booking and nomination decisions in a model of the European entry-exit gas market system. Finally, we use our algorithm to provide a publicly available test library for the considered class of multi-leader multi-follower games. This library contains problem instances with different economic and mathematical properties so that other researchers in the field can test and benchmark newly developed methods for this challenging class of problems.},
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Nowak, Daniel and Schewe, Lars and Schmidt, Martin and Schwartz, Alexandra and Zöttl, Gregor},
doi = {10.1007/s10107-021-01708-0},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {Mathematical Programming},
keywords = {Game theory; Multi-leader multi-follower game; Nash–Cournot equilibria; Peak-load pricing},
note = {CRIS-Team Scopus Importer:2021-12-24},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{A} tractable multi-leader multi-follower peak-load-pricing model with strategic interaction},
year = {2021}
}
@article{faucris.230317103,
abstract = {This work presents a whole-year simulation study on nonlinear mixed-integer Model Predictive Control (MPC) for a complex thermal energy supply system which consists of a heat pump, stratified water storages, free cooling facilities, and a large underground thermal storage. For solution of the arising Mixed-Integer Non-Linear Programs (MINLPs) we apply an existing general and optimal-control-suitable decomposition approach. To compensate deviation of forecast inputs from measured disturbances, we introduce a moving horizon estimation step within the MPC strategy. The MPC performance for this study, which consists of more than 50,000 real-time suitable MINLP solutions, is compared to an elaborate conventional control strategy for the system. It is shown that MPC can significantly reduce the yearly energy consumption while providing a similar degree of constraint satisfaction, and autonomously identify previously unknown, beneficial operation modes.},
author = {Bürger, Adrian and Bohlayer, Markus and Hoffmann, Sarah and Altmann-Dieses, Angelika and Braun, Marco and Diehl, Moritz},
doi = {10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.114064},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {Applied Energy},
keywords = {Energy systems; Mixed-integer nonlinear programming; Model predictive control},
month = {Jan},
note = {CRIS-Team Scopus Importer:2019-12-10},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{A} whole-year simulation study on nonlinear mixed-integer model predictive control for a thermal energy supply system with multi-use components},
volume = {258},
year = {2020}
}
@misc{faucris.215657840,
abstract = {In this data documentation, we provide detailed information on the data that is used in order to calibrate the GATE model. Since we are looking at the hypothetical German electricity market in 2035 and the resulting investment incentives, we have to select all exogenous parameters based on future forecasts for this period. We consider the German market area since excellent data are available from the political processes that accompany the network expansion planning procedure. In order to ensure a high degree of consistency of the exogenous parameters - and in order to allow comparisons with other forecasts for that market area - we predominantly use input parameters from the Network Development Plan Electricity (NDP) which is the official basis for network expansion planning in Germany. Hereby, we mainly rely on the NDP 2025, where network expansion required until 2025 is determined, in its 2015 version.
2
many consecutive spot markets with fluctuating (and possibly uncertain) demand.We study how
the degree of spot market competition affects investment incentives and welfare and provide an
application of the model to electricity market data. We show that more competitive spot market
prices strictly decrease investment incentives of strategic firms. The effect can be severe enough
to even offset the beneficial impact of more competitive spot markets on social welfare. Our
results obtain with and without free entry. The analysis demonstrates that investment incentives
necessarily have to be taken into account for a serious assessment of electricity spot market design.},
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Zöttl, Gregor},
doi = {10.1111/jems.12029},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {Journal of Economics & Management Strategy},
note = {WiSo-Import:2015-03-26:1128},
pages = {832-851},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{Investment} {Incentives} and {Electricity} {Spot} {Market} {Competition}},
volume = {22},
year = {2013}
}
@article{faucris.121038104,
abstract = {This paper analyzes investment incentives for flexible manufacturing facilities under different market designs. We propose a multi-stage equilibrium model incorporating endogenous determination of generation capacity investment, network expansion and redispatch based on the model introduced by Grimm et al. (2016), including flexibilization of industrial electricity consumption. The model allows to investigate incentives for flexibilization and the impact of flexible industrial electricity consumers on the system. An application to the German electricity market reveals that flexible industrial electricity consumption can be profitable for firms. If the share of flexible electricity consumers is high, price fluctuations are mitigated, which lowers the individual cost savings from demand flexibility. Comparing different market designs, positive impacts of flexible electricity demand on the system are observed in both the system optimum and the market equilibrium. In scenarios with flexible industrial electricity consumption, welfare is considerably higher than in those without. This is due to lower electricity costs of industrial consumers, but more importantly due to less investment in conventional power generation as well as a reduced transmission network expansion. However, a comparison of nodal and uniform pricing underlines the importance of regional price signals with respect to an efficient allocation of flexible industrial demand.
übertragungsnetz-Ausbaus diskutiert. Dieser Beitrag analysiert das Potential zweier Maßnahmen, die mit
verhältnismässig geringfügigen Anpassungen des Ordnungsrahmens realisierbar sind: Eine Berücksichtigung
von Möglichkeiten des Redispatch schon bei der Netzentwicklungsplanung und effizientes
Einspeisemanagement. Modellrechnungen zeigen, dass beide Maßnahmen geeignet sind, den Netzausbau zu
reduzieren und eine Kombination beider Maßnahmen sogar einen substanziellen Teil des Netzausbaus
verzichtbar machen kann. Wir zeigen darüber hinaus, dass beide Maßnahmen das Potential haben, moderate
Wohlfahrtsgewinne zu ermöglichen, die sich mittelfristig in niedrigeren Stromkosten wiederspiegeln. Die
Kombination beider Maßnahmen generiert im Modell 83% des Wohlfahrtsgewinns in einem First-Best
Benchmark, in dem alle Investitions- und Produktionsentscheidungen optimal getroffen werde},
author = {Grimm, Veronika and Rückel, Bastian and Sölch, Christian and Zöttl, Gregor},
doi = {10.1007/s41025-016-0027-5},
faupublication = {yes},
journal = {List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik},
pages = {465-498},
peerreviewed = {Yes},
title = {{Zur} {Reduktion} des {Netzausbaubedarfs} durch {Redispatch} und effizientes {Engpassmanagement}: {Eine} modellbasierte {Abschätzung}},
volume = {41},
year = {2016}
}